Securities Fraud or Mere Puffery: Refinement of the Corporate Puffery Defense by Roussel, R. Gregory
Vanderbilt Law Review 
Volume 51 
Issue 4 Issue 4 - Colloquium: Rethinking 
Buchanan v. Warley 
Article 10 
5-1998 
Securities Fraud or Mere Puffery: Refinement of the Corporate 
Puffery Defense 
R. Gregory Roussel 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Securities Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
R. Gregory Roussel, Securities Fraud or Mere Puffery: Refinement of the Corporate Puffery Defense, 51 
Vanderbilt Law Review 1049 (1998) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol51/iss4/10 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, 
please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu. 
Securities Fraud or Mere Puffery: Refinement
of the Corporate Puffery Defense
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................... 1049
II. TAXONOMY OF FORWARD-LOOKING STATEMENTS UNDER
THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS ........................................ 1055
A. The Vagueness Standard ....................................... 1056
B. The Guarantee Standard ....................................... 1061
C. The Contextual Standard ...................................... 1063
III. ANALYSIS OF IMMATERIALITY OF FORWARD-LOOKING
STATEMENTS AS A MATTER OF LAW ................................... 1067
A. Materiality Under Case Law Interpreting
R ule 10b-5 .............................................................. 1067
1. The Definition of Materiality ..................... 1067
2. Materiality when a Duty Exists ................ 1069
B. Materiality Under the Commercial Common Law 1071
C. Materiality and Modern Financial Theory ........... 1075
D. Materiality Under the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ................................ 1081
E. Materiality Policy Considerations ......................... 1083
IV. SYNOPSIS ............................................................................ 1086
V. CONTEXTUAL METHODOLOGY OF THE CORPORATE
PUFFERY DEFENSE ............................................................. 1089
VI. CONCLUSION ...................................................................... 1092
I. INTRODUCTION
A corporation's use of forward-looking corporate statements' is
a common,2 arguably essential,3 element of the landscape of modern
1. For purposes of this Note, "corporate statement" refers to statements regarding the
performance of the corporation made by those authorized to speak on behalf of the corporation,
typically officers, directors, internal public relations departments, outside public relations firms,
or other such designated representatives.
The securities laws define "forward-looking statement" as:
(A) a statement containing a projection of revenues, income (including income loss),
earnings (including earnings loss) per share, capital expenditures, dividends,
capital structure, or other financial items;
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financial markets. Unfortunately, the failure to meet the
expectations created by forward-looking statements often serves as
the basis for a potentially devastating private action for securities
fraud.4 Before Congress responded to frivolous private securities
(B) a statement of the plans and objectives of management for future operations,
including plans or objectives relating to the products or services of the issuer;
(C) a statement of future economic performance, including any such statement
contained in a discussion and analysis of financial condition by the management or
in the results of operations included pursuant to the rules and regulations of the
Commission;
(D) any statement of the assumptions underlying or relating to any statement
described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C);
(E) any report issued by an outside reviewer retained by an issuer, to the extent that
the report assesses a forward-looking statement made by the issuer; or
(F) a statement containing a projection or estimate of such other items as may be
specified by rule or regulation of the Commission.
15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77z-2(i)(1), 78u-5(i)(1) (West 1997); see also Bruce A. Hiler, The SEC and the
Courts' Approach to Disclosure of Earnings Projections, Asset Appraisals, and Other Soft
Information: Old Problems, Changing Views, 46 MD. L. REV. 1114, 1116 (1987) (defining "soft"
or forward-looking information as "information ... that inherently involves some subjective
analysis or extrapolation, such as projections, estimates, opinions, motives, or intentions").
In contrast to forward-looking statements, "hard" information includes historical or factual
information usually subject to SEC disclosure requirements. See id. at 1116. Although some
hard information contains some level of subjectivity, "what has been excluded from those filings
as soft information seems to be distinguishable by the degree of subjectivity involved or the
extent to which objective verification is possible." Id. For an extensive list of literature
specifically addressing the SEC's shift to protect soft information, see 7 LouiS LOSS & JOEL
SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 622 n.66 (3d ed. 1991). Courts usually consider hard
information to be material, and the SEC subjects it to mandatory disclosure requirements. See
Victor Brudney, A Note on Materiality and Soft Information Under the Federal Securities Laws,
75 VA. L. REv. 723, 726-27 (1989) (citing extensive list of mandatory disclosure requirements of
hard information).
2. Corporations commonly use forward-looking statements to discuss their future pros-
pects. See Dale E. Barnes, Jr., & Constance E. Bagley, Case Studies: Great Expectations: Risk
Management Through Risk Disclosure, 1 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 155, 155 (1994) ("Public com-
panies depend on securities analysts to educate the market about their stocks.").
3. See Bart A. Basi et al., A Comparison of the Accuracy of Corporate and Security
Analysts' Forecasts of Earnings, 51 AccT. REv. 244, 252 (1976) ("[Tlhere is reasonable evidence
that company forecasts were better than analysts' forecasts."). Despite the usefulness of for-
ward-looking information to the financial markets, such information is typically not subject to
mandatory SEC disclosure requirements. See In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114
F.3d 1410, 1427 (3d Cir. 1997); In re Lyondell Petrochemical Co. Sec. Litig., 984 F.2d 1050, 1052
(9th Cir. 1993).
4. In such actions, plaintiffs compare the company's stock price as a result of previous
optimistic projections to the price after a decline allegedly resulting from the company's failure
to meet its projections and allege that the officials releasing the projections must have had
knowledge that their forward-looking statements were not entirely accurate. See John F. Olson
et al., Pleading Reform, Plaintiff Qualification and Discovery Stays Under the Reform Act, 51
BUS. LAW. 1101, 1104-07 (1996) (describing and citing examples of abuse of securities fraud
claims by professional plaintiffs and their attorneys); see also S. REP. No. 104-98, at 15-16
(1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 694-95 (citing the vulnerability of companies to
securities fraud lawsuits when projections are not met). These suits are especially disturbing
given the importance of newly formed growth companies in the economy. See Anthony Q.
Fletcher, Note, Curing Crib Death: Emerging Growth Companies, Nuisance Suits, and
Congressional Proposals for Securities Litigation Reform, 32 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 493, 495 (1995)
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fraud class actions with the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
of 1995, 5 ("Reform Act") the judiciary took it upon itself to provide
relief to burdened corporations. 6 In doing so, the courts focused on the
materiality of the corporation's statements, an essential building
block in the plaintiffs construction of a viable private securities fraud
suit.7 These courts developed two principal means by which a
("Empirical data evinces that the confidence of venture capitalists in the securities markets is
critical to the overall health and stability of the economy.").
5. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) [hereinafter the "Reform Act"]; see infra Part
III.D (briefly discussing the safe harbors for corporate forward-looking statements under the
Reform Act); see also Harvey L. Pitt et al., Promises Made, Promises Kept: The Practical
Implications of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 845,
847-52 (1996) (discussing the changes implemented under the Reform Act). The courts decided
the cases to which this Note refers without the benefit of the Reform Act. Analysis of these
cases, however, remains quite useful as the Reform Act left room to accommodate many
judicially created doctrines. For example, the legislative history of the Reform Act indicates
that Congress did not intend the safe harbor to replace the judicial Bespeaks Caution Doctrine
or to foreclose further judicial development of that doctrine. See H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 46
(1995); see also infra note 172 (describing legislative intent to continue use of the puffing
doctrine in securities fraud cases). Prior to the passage of the Reform Act, SEC Rules 175 and
3b-6 provided a limited safe harbor for forward-looking statements made in registered filings if
the company made them in good faith and with a reasonable basis. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.175,
§ 240.3b-6 (1997); Safe Harbor Rule for Projections, Securities Act Release No. 6084 1979 SEC
Lexis 1254 (June 25, 1979) (discussing the appropriateness of a safe harbor for projections made
in good faith and with a reasonable basis). These limited safe harbors, however, are so fact-
intensive that they were useful only at trial; thus, early dismissal of frivolous suits on summary
judgment were nonexistent.
6. In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, the Court recognized problems with
respect to securities fraud litigation that do not exist in other fraud cases. Securities fraud
litigation permits a plaintiff with a groundless claim to conduct extensive discovery, consuming
the time and money of potentially numerous people within the corporation. 421 U.S. 723, 741
(1975). This right represents an in terrorem increment of the settlement value, rather than a
reasonably founded hope that the process will reveal relevant evidence. Such a result is a net
social cost rather than a benefit. See id. The Court also recognized the fact that even a com-
plaint that has very little chance of success at trial creates a significant settlement incentive for
the defendant if the court does not eliminate the suit by dismissal or summary judgment. The
very pendency of the lawsuit may frustrate or delay the defendant's ordinary business activity.
See id. at 740 (citing, inter alia, Michael P. Dooley, The Effects of Civil Liability on Investment
Banking and the New Issues Market, 58 VA. L. REv. 776, 822-43 (1972), and James C. Sargent,
The SEC and the Individual Investor: Restoring His Confidence in the Market, 60 VA. L. REv.
553, 562-72 (1974)).
The SEC also has recognized the "substantial unnecessary costs" of abusive private securi-
ties fraud claims. See Common Sense Legal Reform Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Telecomm. and Fin. of the House Comm. on Commerce, 104th Cong. 196 (1995) (statement of
SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt). Chairman Levitt noted that "the pendulum had swung too far
toward plaintiffs, and it needs to be brought into better balance." Arthur Levitt, Final Thoughts
on Litigation Reform, Remarks at the Twenty-Third Annual Securities Regulation Institute, in 1
SWEEPING REFORM: LITIGATING AND BESPEAKING CAUTION UNDER THE NEW SECURITIES LAW
400 (PLI Corp. Law and Practice Handbook Series Nos. B-923, B-924, 1996).
7. In order to proceed in an action for securities fraud under 10b-5, the plaintiff must
prove that the corporation released a "(1) misstatement or an omission (2) of material fact (3)
made with scienter (4) on which the plaintiff relied (5) that proximately caused his injury."
Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 543 (5th Cir. 1981) (citations omitted), rev'd
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corporate defendant could seek dismissal of such suits as a matter of
law:8 the Bespeaks Caution Doctrine and the Corporate Puffery
Defense. 9
Under the Bespeaks Caution Doctrine, a court will find
forward-looking corporate statements immaterial as a matter of law if
the statements are accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements
and specific risk disclosure.10 The Corporate Puffery Defense asserts
on other grounds, 459 U.S. 375 (1983); see also infra Part III.A (discussing the definition and
role of materiality in private securities fraud litigation). The materiality of a forward-looking
statement is a pivotol element in an actionable claim of securities fraud pursuant to Section
10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1995) [hereinafter the
Exchange Act], and SEC Rule 10b-5. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1997) [hereinafter Rule 10b-5]. Rule
10b-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange, (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact nec-
essary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in any act, practice or course of
business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Id. (emphasis added).
8. See cases cited infra Part II. If the statements on which private securities fraud
actions are brought are determined to be immaterial as a matter of law, the litigation ceases,
and the court avoids the time and cost intensive discovery process on these issues. Therefore,
the dismissal of private securities fraud claims on a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary
judgment is an efficient method of avoiding discovery and trial costs.
9. The use of the puffery doctrine as a defense to securities fraud will hereinafter be
referred to as the Corporate Puffery Defense so as to distinguish it from the commercial
common law doctrine of puffery.
10. Such cautionary language, or risk disclosure, renders the offending misstatements le-
gally immaterial so as not to recognize any influence on a reasonable investor's investment
decision. See Whirlpool Fin. Corp. v. GN Holdings, Inc., 873 F. Supp. 111, 122 (N.D. 111. 1995)
(stating that it is unreasonable as a matter of law for an investor to rely on projections as a
forecast of the future if sufficiently cautionary language accompanies the projections); see also
In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 793 F. Supp. 543, 549 (D.N.J. 1992) (stating that
where "an offering statement, such as a prospectus, accompanies statements of its future
forecasts, projections and expectations with adequate cautionary language, those statements are
not actionable as securities fraud"); Royce de R. Barondes, The Bespeaks Caution Doctrine:
Revisiting the Application of Federal Securities Law to Opinions and Estimates, 19 J. CORP. L.
243, 251-68 (1994) (surveying applications of the Bespeaks Caution Doctrine across the circuits);
Donald C. Langevoort, Disclosures that "Bespeak Caution", 49 Bus. LAW. 481, 482-96 (1994)
(defining the Bespeaks Caution Doctrine).
The Bespeaks Caution Doctrine does not treat the mere presence of cautionary statements
as a "magic bullet," however. See Langevoort, supra, at 486 (discounting the strong use of the
Bespeaks Caution Doctrine where the court mechanically applies the doctrine to dismiss claims
that merely contain such cautionary language without undergoing the contextual inquiry as
suggested by Trump Casino Securities Litigation). Cautionary statements must be tailored
specifically to the misleading corporate statements and relevant in the context they were made.
See In re Marion Merrell Dow, Inc., Sec. Litig., No. 92-0609-CV-W-6, 1993 WL 393810, at *8
(W.D. Mo. Oct. 4, 1993) (finding that the cautionary language was not repeated nor specific
enough to be immaterial as a matter of law); In re Jenny Craig Sec. Litig., [1992-1993 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 97,337, at 95,723 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 1992) (finding the
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that some forward-looking statements are so vague or indefinite that
they do not affect the price of the security and, therefore, are
immaterial as a matter of law." While the Bespeaks Caution
Doctrine enjoys wide acceptance among the courts, 12 the Corporate
Puffery Defense is less familiar to the judiciary and doctrinally
underdeveloped by commentators. 13 Despite the remarks of some
commentators that "the puffing concept in the securities context has
all but gone the way of the dodo," 4 every circuit has recently applied
some variation of the puffery concept to dismiss private securities
fraud actions. 15
cautionary statements to be "too weak" and "too general" considering the strength of the
defendant's statements of optimism).
11. See Raab v. General Physics Corp., 4 F.3d 286, 290 (4th Cir. 1993) (defining the puff-
ery doctrine in the securities fraud arena). For examples of corporate language that has been
held to be so vague or indefinite as a matter of law, see infra note 31. The use of the puffery
doctrine in the securities fraud context is similar to the puffery doctrine developed under the
commercial common law of fraud. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS § 109, at 757 (5th ed. 1984) (defining the puffery doctrine in the context of
common law fraud cases); see also infra Part III.B (comparing the use of the puffery doctrine in
securities fraud and commercial common law fraud).
12. See, e.g., Gasner v. Board of Supervisors, 103 F.3d 351, 358 (4th Cir. 1996); Saltzberg
v. TM Sterling/Austin Assoc., Ltd., 45 F.3d 399, 400 (11th Cir. 1995); In re Worlds of Wonder
Sec. Litig., 35 F.3d 1407, 1414 (9th Cir. 1994); Rubenstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 160, 166-67 (5th
Cir. 1994); In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d 357, 371-73 (3d Cir. 1993); Romani
v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 929 F.2d 875, 879 (1st Cir. 1991); I. Meyer Pincus & Assocs. v.
Oppenheimer & Co., 936 F.2d 759, 763 (2d Cir. 1991); Sinay v. Lamson & Sessions Co., 948 F.2d
1037, 1040 (6th Cir. 1991); Polin v. Conductron Corp., 552 F.2d 797, 806 n.28 (8th Cir. 1977).
13. See infra Part II (discussing the competing methodologies of the Corporate Puffery
Defense). Although the Bespeaks Caution Doctrine is theoretically distinct from the Corporate
Puffery Defense, the two doctrines are sufficiently similar to guide courts in the proper
application of the Corporate Puffery Defense. At the time of publication of this Note, few
commentators have recognized the Corporate Puffery Defense; thus none have developed a
coherent method for applying the doctrine. See, e.g., LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 1, at 3434
(discussing application of the puffery doctrine to securities law); HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL,
Securities Law Handbook, 755-58 (CBC 1997 ed.) (discussing the increased recognition of the
puffing concept in securities law); Langevoort, supra note 10, at 487 (mentioning the application
of the puffing concept to securities fraud in relation to the Bespeaks Caution Doctrine); see also
Langevoort, supra note 10, at 487 (stating that the difference between the two doctrines should
not be emphasized).
14. LOSs & SELIGMAN, supra note 1, at 3434.
15. See, e.g., Parnes v. Gateway 2000 Inc., No. 96-1559, 1997 WL 448153 (8th Cir. Aug. 8,
1997); Grossman v. Novell, 120 F.3d 1112 (10th Cir. 1997); In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec.
Litig., 114 F.3d 1410 (3d Cir. 1997); Eisenstadt v. Centel Corp., 113 F.3d 738 (7th Cir. 1997);
Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194 (1st Cir. 1996); San Leandro Emergency Med. Group
Profit Sharing Plan v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc., 75 F.3d 801 (2d Cir. 1996); In re Royal Appliance
Sec. Litig., No. 94-3284, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 24626, (6th Cir. Aug. 15, 1995) (not
recommended for full text publication); Malone v. Microdyne Corp., 26 F.3d 471 (4th Cir. 1994);
Kowal v. MCI Communications Corp., 16 F.3d 1271 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Krim v. BancTexas Group,
Inc., 989 F.2d 1435 (5th Cir. 1993); In re Convergent Techs. Sec. Litig., 948 F.2d 507 (9th Cir.
1991).
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Courts, however, seldom agree on the characteristics of for-
ward-looking corporate statements that warrant a finding of immate-
riality as a matter of law. While some circuits have found only fa-
cially vague statements to be immaterial as a matter of law, 16 other
circuits have expanded the puffing concept to protect any forward-
looking statement that fails to rise to the level of a guarantee.,, Still
other courts have applied a contextual approach, which considers the
forward-looking corporate statement in light of all the information
available to the market. 18 This Note compares and analyzes the judi-
cial struggles to devise a satisfactory standard for evaluating inde-
terminate forward-looking statements.19 The purpose of this Note is
to suggest a cognizable methodology to determine whether a given
corporate statement sufficiently supports an actionable claim of secu-
rities fraud or amounts to nothing more than mere puffery.
Part II of this Note classifies and summarizes the different
standards courts use to decide if forward-looking statements are
immaterial as a matter of law and, thus, inactionable under the
securities laws. Generally, courts use one of three different
standards: the Vagueness Standard,20 the Guarantee Standard, 2' and
the Contextual Standard. 2 Part III analyzes these three standards'
consistency with the following factors: (a) prior securities fraud
jurisprudence; (b) commercial common law of fraud; (c) modern
financial theory; (d) the Reform Act; and (e) public policy concerns
underlying securities fraud litigation. This Note concludes that
16. This methodology will hereinafter be referred to as the Vagueness Standard. See infra
Part II.A (discussing the analysis posited by the circuits in dismissing claims based on facially
vague corporate statements).
17. This methodology will hereinafter be referred to as the Guarantee Standard. See infra
Part II.B (discussing the circuits' analysis when dismissing claims based on forward-looking
corporate statements that fail to rise to the level of a guarantee).
18. This methodology will hereinafter be referred to as the Contextual Standard. See
infra Part II.C (discussing the circuits' analysis when dismissing claims based on a contextual
application of the Corporate Puffery Defense).
19. To a certain extent, the Corporate Puffery Defense clearly provides a valuable tool to
hold back the floodgates of frivolous securities fraud claims and avoid liability for natural
optimism. Drawing a bright line clearly defining what constitutes puffery in every instance,
however, is impossible.
As the Supreme Court has stated:
Fraud is infinite, and were a Court of Equity once to lay down rules, how far they would
go, and no farther, in extending their relief against it, or to define strictly the species or
evidence of it, the jurisdiction would be cramped, and perpetually eluded by new
schemes which the fertility of man's invention would contrive.
SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 193 n.41 (1963) (quoting a statement
first made in a letter of Lord Hardwicke to Lord Kames in 1759).
20. See infra Part II.A.
21. See infra Part II.B.
22. See infra Part H.C.
1054 [Vol. 51:1049
CORPORATE PUFFERY DEFENSE
courts should not expand the defense to protect all forward-looking
statements as suggested by the Guarantee Standard.23 At the same
time, they should continue to use the Corporate Puffery Defense to
dispense with securities fraud claims based on facially vague
language found immaterial in the context of all the information
available to the markets.
Part IV recommends that courts use a two-part contextual
analysis to evaluate forward-looking statements under the Corporate
Puffery Defense. This Note recommends that the court evaluate
whether the statement is inherently vague as a threshold matter. If
the forward-looking statement is not specific,24 the court should then
evaluate the statement in the context of all information available to
the market. If the court finds that the forward-looking corporate
statement affected the market price of the security despite the vague
language, the court should deny defendant's motion to dismiss or
motion for summary judgment. This contextual application of the
Corporate Puffery Defense allows courts to dismiss meritless
securities fraud claims based on irrelevant puffing statements, yet it
permits courts to proceed with deserving securities fraud claims by
considering the context in which the market evaluates the
information. Such an approach achieves an optimal balance between
judicial efficiency and fairness to plaintiffs.
II. TAXONOMY OF FORWARD-LOOKING STATEMENTS UNDER THE
FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS
Although the SEC once discouraged the disclosure of forward-
looking information to protect unsophisticated investors, 25 it changed
its position in 1979 to permit such disclosures. 26 While permitting the
23. The use of the defense to protect all uncertain forward-looking statements is entirely
inconsistent with prior precedent assessing materiality, the commercial common law, modern
financial theory, the Reform Act, and public policy. The analysis supporting this assertion is
contained in Part IV.
24. See Raab v. General Physics Corp., 4 F.3d 286, 290 (4th Cir. 1993) (finding corporate
language to lack the specificity required to support a private securities fraud claim).
25. See Disclosure of Projections of Future Economic Performance, Securities Act Release
No. 5362, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 79211, at 82,666 (Feb. 2, 1973)
[hereinafter Projections] ("It has been the long-standing policy generally not to permit
projections to be included in prospectuses and reports filed with the commission.").
26. On June 25, 1979, the SEC adopted final rules providing safe harbors for forward-
looking statements in Rule 3b-6 under the Exchange Act, 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-6 (1997), and Rule
175 under the Securities Act. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.175 (1997); see also HOUSE COMMITTEE ON
INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 95TH CONG., 1ST SESS., REPORT OF THE ADVISORY
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disclosure of forward-looking statements, the SEC did not include
forward-looking information in the list of mandatory disclosure re-
quirements.27 As a result, courts have advanced competing views of
when, if ever, forward-looking statements are sufficiently material to
support a private securities fraud claim.28
Within this morass of ambiguity, the Corporate Puffery
Defense emerges as a valid and justifiable attempt to defeat securities
fraud claims on a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary
judgment. In an attempt to dismiss securities fraud claims
efficiently, however, some courts have expanded the puffery concept
beyond its theoretical limit.29 For analytical purposes, this Note
divides these decisions into three categories based on the courts'
underlying rationale for dismissal: (1) the Vagueness Standard; (2)
the Guarantee Standard; and (3) the Contextual Standard.30
A. The Vagueness Standard
Courts consistently have protected facially vague forward-
looking statements made by corporations.31 In Raab v. General
COMMI2TEE ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE To THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 556,
556-60 (Comm. Print 1977) (discussing President Roosevelt's recommendation that the SEC's
policy be changed to encourage the disclosure of management projections and other forward-
looking information); LoSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 1, at 1953 (providing an in-depth summary
of the SEC's changing positions on disclosure of soft information and the resulting divergent
treatment of soft information among the lower courts). The Commission recognized the wide-
spread use and reliance on institutional and individual investors' projections to determine
future economic performance. See Projections, supra note 25, at 82,667; Hiler, supra note 1, at
1117-18 (discussing the problems of assessing liability on soft forward-looking statements).
27. Regulation S-K contains a textual description of the SEC's mandatory disclosure
requirements. 17 C.F.R. § 229 (1996).
28. Compare infra Parts II.A, II.B, and II.C.
29. See, e.g., Herman v. Legent Corp., 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 5568, at *13-14 (4th Cir.
Mar. 20, 1995) (holding that all forward-looking statements that do not constitute guarantees
should be dismissed as immaterial as a matter of law); Hilson Malone v. Microdyne Corp., 26
F.3d 471, 479 (4th Cir. 1994) (same); Partners Ltd. Partnership v. Adage, Inc., 42 F.3d 204, 211-
12 (4th Cir. 1994) (same); Raab, 4 F.3d at 289-90 (same).
30. These classifications are inherently imprecise because of the wide variety of language
that has been alleged to constitute securities fraud. Even though courts' rationales usually fit
into one of these categories, some courts alternatively apply both the Vagueness Standard and
the Guarantee Standard to find the corporate statements immaterial as a matter of law. For
cases applying both the Vagueness Standard and the Guarantee Standard, see Lasker v. New
York State Elec. & Gas Corp. 85 F.3d 55, 58-59 (2d Cir. 1996); Searls v. Glasser, 64 F.3d 1061,
1066 (7th Cir. 1995); San Leandro Emergency Med. Group Profit Sharing Plan v. Philip Morris
Cos., Inc., 73 F.3d 801, 811 (2d Cir. 1996); Raab, 4 F.3d at 290. The fact that many statements
contain elements of more than one category and that some courts use more than one line of
analysis further exacerbates the imprecision.
31. In addition to the Raab case discussed below, many other courts have considered some
forward-looking statements to be so vague that no reasonable investor would rely on them to be
immaterial as a matter of law. Quoting the language from Raab, the Eighth Circuit adopted the
1056
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Fourth Circuit's practice of dismissing vague statements of optimism as per se immaterial in
Parnes v. Gateway 2000. 122 F.3d 539, 547 (8th Cir. 1997) (citing to Hillson's reference to Raab
and finding certain forward-looking statements so vague and "such obvious hyperbole that no
reasonable investor would rely on them").
Similarly, the Third Circuit concurred with Raab's vague statement analysis in In re
Burlington Coat Factory Securities Litigation. 114 F.3d 1410, 1427-28 (3d Cir. 1997). In
Burlington, the court found that the chief accounting officer's statements "that the company
'believe[d] [it could] continue to grow net earnings at a faster rate than sales'" to be the kind of
"vague expressions of hope by corporate managers" that courts reject "almost uniformly." Id. at
1427. The Burlington court, however, distinguished some statements made by Burlington Coat
Factory, finding that the Corporate Puffery Defense did not apply because the corporate state-
ments specifically projected earnings per share to be between $1.20 and $1.30 for 1994. See id.
at 1428 n.14. Likewise, in Weiner v. Quaker Oats Co., the Third Circuit found defendant's
statement at a public meeting (that Quaker Oats was " 'confident of achieving at least [seven
percent] real earnings growth' in fiscal 1995") was a specific figure regarding a particular,
defined time period and, therefore, could not qualify as an inactionable puffing statement. 129
F.3d 310, 320 (3d Cir. 1997).
The Tenth Circuit also accepted this notion of vague statements in Grossman v. Novell, Inc.,
120 F.3d 1112, 1119 (10th Cir. 1997). In Grossman, the court held that statements made by
Novell and its CEO were "soft, puffing statements, incapable of objective verification" and
should be dismissed as vague statements of corporate optimism. See id. at 1121-22. Statements
made by Novell included: "By moving rapidly to a fully integrated sales force, we are leveraging
our combined knowledge of the expanding scope of network solutions;" and that it "expects that
network applications will quickly reshape customer expectations." Id. at 1121. Statements
made by Novell's CEO included comments on Novell's substantial success in integrating the
sales force of WordPerfect with its own; its merger moving "faster than we thought" and that
the merger presented "a compelling set of opportunities" for Novell. Id. Whether the Tenth
Circuit intended to add the absence of "objective verification" as a new element to the puffery
determination is unclear. The Grossman court, however, did not base its holding on analysis
focusing on the court's ability to objectively verify Novell's statements. See id. at 1119-22
(focusing only on the vague indeterminacy of the corporate statements).
In In re Royal Appliance Securities Litigation, the Sixth Circuit seemingly agreed with the
Raab analysis. No. 94-3284, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 24626, at *7 (6th Cir. Aug. 15, 1995) (not
recommended for full text publication and limited by Sixth Circuit Rule 24 to specific situ-
ations). The Royal Appliance language, however, would be inconsistent with the Sixth Circuit's
contextual treatment of the Bespeaks Caution Doctrine. See id. at *8-*13; see, e.g., Stavroffv.
Meyo, No. 95-4118, 1997 WL 720475 at *5 (6th Cir. Nov. 12, 1997) ("To determine whether
statements fall under the bespeaks caution doctrine, we review the statements in context and
examine the 'total mix' of information available to the reasonable investor."); Harner v.
Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., Nos. 92-1353, 92-1910, 1994 WL 494871, at *7 (6th Cir. Sept. 8,
1994) (finding that investors' reliance was unreasonable considering the information available
to them under the circumstances).
The Seventh Circuit recognized vague statements' immateriality in Searls v. Glasser. 64
F.3d 1061 (7th Cir. 1995). In Searls, the court found that statements characterizing GATX as
"recession-resistant" were too vague to be material, stating that such statements provided no
useful information a reasonable investor could use in making investment decisions. See id. at
1066. The Seventh Circuit, however, declined to accept a per se rule regarding the
immateriality of vague corporate statements. See id. at 1067.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals declined to consider the concept of wholesale immate-
riality for vague statements of optimism. The court instead evaluated securities fraud claims
for similar optimistic statements under a three-part test. This test, developed in In re Apple
Securities Litigation, prohibits fraud claims if: (1) The statement was not believed, (2) the
statement has a reasonable basis, or (3) the speaker was not aware of "undisclosed facts tending
to seriously undermine the accuracy of the statement." 886 F.2d 1109, 1113 (9th Cir. 1989).
Although the Ninth Circuit has not considered specifically the Corporate Puffery Defense, a
large number of Ninth Circuit district courts have dismissed securities fraud claims as a matter
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Physics Corp., for example, the plaintiffs alleged that they purchased
General Physics stock in reliance upon certain statements that
fraudulently inflated the stock's price.32 These statements included
General Physics's predictions in its 1991 annual report anticipating a
ten to thirty percent annual growth rate over the next several years
for the Department of Energy Services Group in the company,33 and
its statement that the group would likely carry the growth and suc-
of law where the statements were too vague, mere puffery, or "soft forecasts" upon which
reasonable investors would not rely. Given the focus of securities litigation in the high-tech
sector, the proliferation of cases in the Northern District of California is not surprising. These
cases provide an excellent forum to showcase examples of language that courts typically con-
sider so vague as to be immaterial as a matter of law. See, e.g., Howard Gunty Profit Sharing v.
Quantum Corp., No. 9620111 SW, 1997 WL 514993, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 1997) (holding
that Quantum's vague statements that "customer interest is very exciting," and that the CEO
was 'confident that the company ... will be successful with its new business model" would not
be relied upon by reasonable investors and were "certainly not specific enough to perpetrate
fraud on the market"); Fisher v. Acuson Corp., 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19968, at *9 (N.D. Cal.
Apr. 26, 1995) ('[Sltatements such as that [product] was the 'gold standard' or that [company] is
positioned well for the future are too vague to constitute material misstatements.... ."); In re
Valence Tech. Sec. Litig., [1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 98,793, at 92,793
(N.D. Cal. 1995) (holding the following statements to be too vague and reflect general optimism:
"We are very excited about the tremendous potential for lithium polymer batteries"; "We are
loyal to our cause and excited about our prospects"; "As you know the market offers a
tremendous opportunity and we believe our technology is superior"; "This agreement provides
us with the opportunity to apply our technology in another market"); O'Sullivan v. Trident
Microsystems, Inc., [1993-1994 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 98,116, at 98,916
(N.D. Cal. 1994) (finding that the statement "we think Trident's potential is substantial" to be
an inactionable statement of vague optimism); Rogal v. Costello, [1992-1993 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 97,245, at 95,093-94 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (finding a "more positive outlook
for the June quarter" and an " 'apparent upswing' in the buying intentions of U.S. customers"
too vague to support a securities fraud action). None of the Ninth Circuit's or its district courts'
cases adopt or refer to the Fourth Circuit's requirement that the statements constitute a
guarantee of future performance to be actionable. See supra note 29 (citing Fourth Circuit
Guarantee Standard cases). These cases, however, demonstrate the trend toward a per se
immateriality rule for vague statements of optimism, although the Ninth Circuit has not made
such a sweeping statement.
32. 4 F.3d 286, 287-88 (4th Cir. 1993). Not all courts finding general forward-looking
statements to be immaterial as a matter of law agree with the Raab court's analysis regarding
vague statements. For example, in McCarthy v. C-Cor Electronics, Inc., the court explicitly
rejected the presumption that vague, forward-looking statements are per se immaterial as a
matter of law. 909 F. Supp. 970, 977 (E.D. Pa. 1995). Instead, the McCarthy court listed factors
that, if present, would lead a reasonable investor to believe that the statements are grounded in
a reliable basis. See id. Those factors, although not intended to be a comprehensive list,
include: (1) the prediction's specificity; (2) whether the prediction is short-term or long-term;
and (3) the degree to which the prediction is inherently difficult or unreliable. See id. Applying
these factors, the McCarthy court found that a statement in the defendant's press release
predicting strong revenues for the second half of the year and "a strong fourth quarter" was
sufficiently material to support a claim of securities fraud. Id. Although the McCarthy court
avoided declaring a per se rule for puffing statements, it offered guidance to corporations
regarding their public statements and put the investing public on notice as to which statements
are so vague that they are not worthy of reliance.
33. See Raab, 4 F.3d at 287-88.
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cess of General Physics into the future.34  When General Physics
issued a press release stating that earnings for the second quarter
would be less than expected, 35 the price of General Physics stock
dropped thirty-six percent in one day.36  Plaintiffs alleged that
General Physics must have known about the factors causing
decreased earnings prior to the press release and, therefore, had
misled investors. The Fourth Circuit held that the statements were
puffing statements, and because such vague statements predicting
growth do not inflate the market price of a share, they are immaterial
as a matter of law.37
The Raab court recognized that securities fraud claims alleg-
ing fraud on the market 38 hinge on the company's ability to trick the
market. Finding that market professionals 39 rely only on specific
statements in determining the price of a security,40 rather than on
34. See id.
35. See id. The earnings decline resulted from the "continuing delays in the award of
Department of Energy contracts and costs resulting from the need to retain professional staff
pending new contracts." Id.
36. See id.
37. See id. at 289 (citing, inter alia, Howard v. Haddad, 962 F.2d 328, 331 (4th Cir. 1992)
and Lewis v. Chrysler Corp., 949 F.2d 644, 652-53 (3d Cir. 1991)); see also Schoenhaut v.
American Sensors, Inc., No. 95 Civ. 1464 (BSJ), 1997 WL 731804, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 1997)
(finding statements that do not attempt to "ensure definite or guaranteed growth, make specific
earnings projections, predict future financial performance, or set any benchmarks" to constitute
immaterial information not relied upon by investors); Herman v. Legent Corp., 1995 U.S. App.
LEXIS 5568, at *17 (4th Cir. Mar. 20, 1995) (finding that a press release predicting that Legent
was firmly on its plan for earnings growth of 20% "simply lacke[d] the necessary level of specific-
ity" and could not be found by a reasonable jury to constitute a guarantee, and therefore was not
actionable as fraud); Hillson Partners Ltd. Partnership v. Adage, Inc., 42 F.3d 204, 212 (4th Cir.
1994) (holding that statements contained in press releases and the first quarter report stating
"significant sales gains should be seen as the year progresses," that "1992 will produce excellent
results for Adage," and that Adage was "on target toward achieving the most profitable year in
history" were vague growth predictions that were immaterial as a matter of law).
38. See infra text accompanying notes 134-136 (defining the fraud-on-the-market theory).
39. Commentators have interpreted the court's use of the terms "analysts and arbitra-
geurs," to refer to market professionals or "market makers" in general. See John M. Newman,
Jr. et al., Basic Truths: The Implications of the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory for Evaluating the
"Misleading" and "Materiality" Elements of Securities Fraud Claims, 20 J. CORP. L. 571, 573 &
n.23 (1995). Courts distinguishing between the average or reasonable investor and the profes-
sional investor have held implicitly that the standard of materiality necessary to perpetuate a
fraud on the market is based on the professional investor's sophisticated ability to determine the
relevance of information to the stock price because the professional actually moves markets.
See id.; see also infra notes 142-43 (discussing the role of professional investors in setting the
market price of a security). Despite the importance of market professionals in determining
market price, many courts continue to use a reasonable investor standard in defining material-
ity for claims of securities fraud. See Newman, Jr. et al., supra, at 573 & n.23.
40. In Cooke v. Manufactured Homes, Inc., the defending company supported its projec-
tions of future growth with specific statements of fact, such as its repurchase of 400,000 shares
of its own stock and negotiations with an insurance company to act as a guarantor on its loans.
998 F.2d 1256, 1259-61 (4th Cir. 1993). Such factual statements were sufficient to create
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:1049
mere optimism, the Raab court held that only specific statements are
actionable. 41 Since a reasonable investor would not rely on such vague
statements, market professionals would not consider corporate puff-
ing statements in setting the market price of a security.42 Where the
market is unaffected by information, plaintiffs can make no securities
fraud claim under the fraud-on-the-market theory.43 Under the Raab
court's application of the Corporate Puffery Defense, a court should
determine whether a statement constitutes puffery by examining the
corporate statement in the abstract, devoid of the context in which it
was made.44 Thus, in Raab, the Fourth Circuit essentially adopted a
rule that such facially vague statements are immaterial as a matter of
law.45
The Seventh Circuit expanded the Corporate Puffery Defense
in Eisenstadt v. Centel Corp.46 Using a reasonable investor standard,
the Eisenstadt court stated that investors not only ignore puffing
statements, but also expect a certain amount of puffing in corporate
statements.47 The Seventh Circuit encouraged this level of puffery in
corporate statements, noting that given the expectation of puffery,
completely candid statements would indicate that the actual pros-
pects were much dimmer.4s
different interpretations as to whether the generalized forward-looking statements were
material. See id. at 1261-62. Other courts have distinguished puffery from material mis-
statements based on the inclusion of specific percentages. See, e.g., Cohen v. Prudential-Bache
Sec., Inc., 713 F. Supp. 653, 658 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (finding that the inclusion of specific percentage
precluded a finding of puffery); Newman v. L.F. Rothschild, 662 F. Supp. 957, 959 (S.D.N.Y.
1987) (same). This analysis assumes that investors' reliance is triggered only by the use of
specific data that leave little doubt as to content and significance of the statement; the lack of
such data leaves the investor with an uncertain interpretation, rendering any reliance
unreasonable. This rule for identifying puffery would render any forward-looking corporate
statement that fails to include specific numbers immaterial as a matter of law. See id.(dismissing vague statements as mere puffery while maintaining securities fraud actions
supported by corporate forward-looking statements containing specific percentages). But see
infra Parts IV & V (arguing that the lack of specific information alone is insufficient to deem a
forward-looking statement immaterial as a matter of law because some vague statements could
impact the price of a security and should therefore be found material).
41. See Raab, 4 F.3d at 290; see also infra notes 142-43 (recognizing the importance of
market professionals in determining the price of a security).
42. See Raab, 4 F.3d at 290.
43. See infra notes 134-36 (discussing fraud on the market).
44. See Raab, 4 F.3d at 288-90 (examining only the four corners of each statement inde-
pendent of the total mix of information available to the market).
45. See Herman v. Legent Corp., 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 5568, at *14 (4th Cir. Mar. 20,
1995) ("Once a statement is determined to be commonplace commercial puffery, our inquiry
ends.").
46. 113 F.3d 738 (7th Cir. 1997).
47. See id. at 746 (stating that "Centel put a rosy face on an inherently uncertain process;
investors would have expected no less").
48. See id.
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B. The Guarantee Standard
Other courts have dismissed securities fraud claims based on
forward-looking statements that fail to rise to the level of a guaran-
tee.49 The Fourth Circuit addressed the actionability of forward-
looking corporate statements under this Guarantee Standard in
Hillson Partners Ltd. Partnership v. Adage, Inc.50 In Hillson Partners,
the court stated that an articulation of a time frame within which a
prediction by itself was insufficient to qualify as an actionable claim.51
The court stated that to rise to the level of a guarantee, and thus be
sufficiently material to support a private claim of securities fraud, the
forward-looking statement must contain not only predictions of the
time frame but also a specific dollar amount or numerous positive
predictions.52
49. In addition to the Fourth Circuit cases discussed below, other courts have held that
forward-looking statements that fail to rise to the level of a guarantee are immaterial as a
matter of law. In San Leandro Emergency Medical Group Profit Sharing Plan v. Philip Morris
Co., the Second Circuit analyzed corporate statements, including those indicating that the
company was optimistic about earnings and that the company should perform well, under the
Guarantee Standard, although the statements were arguably vague in nature. 75 F.3d 801 (2d
Cir. 1996). The court said the company announcements were "puffery [which] cannot have
misled a reasonable investor to believe the company had irrevocably committed itself to one
particular strategy." Id. at 811. In San Leandro, the Second Circuit incorrectly used the term
"puffery" to describe forward-looking statements of opinion rather than to identify vague
forward-looking statements. Such careless rhetoric has contributed to the confusion
surrounding the Corporate Puffery Defense. Although the Second Circuit focused on the
forward-looking nature of the statements in San Leandro, the Eastern District of New York
cited this case to support a finding of immateriality as a matter of law for forward-looking
statements that were too vague. See In re Symbol Tech. Class Action Litig., No. 92-CV-3492,
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 365, at *12-14 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 1997). The Second Circuit affirmed its
San Leandro holding later that year in Lasker v. New York State Electric & Gas Corp. 85 F.3d
55 (2d Cir. 1996). Like in San Leandro, the court in Lasker found the defendant's statements to
be inactionable puffing statements which did not constitute guarantees. See id. at 59.
Specifically, the company stated that it "would not compromise its financial integrity," that it
had a "commitment to create earnings opportunities," and that these "business strategies
[would] lead to continued prosperity." Id. The Lasker court, however, did not expressly
condition the finding of immateriality as a matter of law on the ability of the statement to
qualify as a guarantee. See id. Despite holding that forward-looking statements can be
immaterial as a matter of law under certain circumstances, the Second Circuit declined to apply
a per se rule that forward-looking statements must rise to the level of a guarantee to be
actionable. See id.
50. 42 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 1994).
51. See id. at 214-15.
52. See id. at 215 (citing Goldman v. Belden, 754 F. 2d 1059, 1068-69 (2d Cir. 1985), and
Marx v. Computer Sciences Corp., 507 F.2d 485, 489 (9th Cir. 1974), as examples to show that
other cases have only considered timing when there were "allegations of specific evidence, other
than timing, demonstrating that... [the] predictions had no factual basis").
The Fourth Circuit also derided the plaintiffs allegations that the statements were "hard
statements of corporate operations and performance for the near term." Id. at 216. In addition,
the Fourth Circuit identified a statement in the Wall Street Journal that " '[t]he executive is
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The Fourth Circuit's Guarantee Standard repeatedly holds
that all forward-looking statements that do not constitute guarantees
are immaterial as a matter of law.53 The Fourth Circuit attempts to
justify this standard by stating that hindsight will often prove predic-
tions of future growth to be wrong, and, therefore, courts should not
hold corporations liable for predictions that fail to materialize. 54 The
Fourth Circuit recognized that if buyers could sue when growth is less
than predicted, while sellers could sue if this growth is greater than
anticipated, companies would be in a "whipsaw," faced with certain
litigation. 5 Corporations would then be reluctant to disclose any
information. 56  To avoid this result, the Fourth Circuit gave
considerable protection to corporations by holding that forward-
looking statements would be immaterial as a matter of law unless
they rose to the level of a guarantee. 57 This rule does not preclude
explicitly private securities fraud claims against all forward-looking
statements; however, in procedural terms, the likelihood that any
forward-looking statement will meet the extremely high threshold of a
guarantee is virtually nonexistent.58  In this respect, the court
seemingly implied that all forward-looking statements are immaterial
as a matter of law.
looking for 1992 sales of about $100 million and 1993 sales of about $110 million' " as obviously
not rising to the level of a guarantee. Id.
53. See, e.g., Herman v. Legent Corp., 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 5568, at *13-*14 (4th Cir.
Mar. 20, 1995) (holding that forward-looking statements are generally not actionable as a
matter of law when they neither rise to the level of a guarantee nor include a specific statement
of fact); Hillson Partners Ltd. Partnership v. Adage, Inc., 42 F.3d 204, 211-12 (4th Cir. 1994)
(same); Malone v. Microdyne Corp., 26 F.3d 471, 479 (4th Cir. 1994) (same); Raab v. General
Physics Corp., 4 F.3d 286, 289-90 (4th Cir. 1993) (same).
54. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 53.
55. See Raab, 4 F.3d at 290 (noting that if a company makes a 25% growth prediction, a
growth rate of 20% is just as statistically likely as a growth rate of 30%).
56. This result was especially disturbing to the Fourth Circuit because disclosure is the
primary goal of the securities laws. See id.
57. See id. (citing Krim v. BancTexas Group, Inc., 989 F.2d 1435, 1446 (5th Cir. 1993));
see, e.g., Herman, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 5568, at *13-*14 (holding that forward-looking
statements are generally not actionable as a matter of law when they neither rise to the level of
a guarantee nor include a specific statement of fact); Hillson Partners, 42 F.3d at 211-12 (same);
Malone, 26 F.3d at 479 (same); Raab, 4 F.3d at 289-90 (same). In Raab, the Fourth Circuit did
recognize that expressions of belief or fact relating to current facts could be material. 4 F.3d at
290 (citing Virginia Bankshares Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1090-95 (1991)). The court,
however, did not believe this analysis could be applied to opinions on future events. See id.
58. At the present time, no court that has applied this Guarantee Standard to corporate
statements has found the language to constitute an actionable guarantee. Stare decisis should
have prevented such wholesale denial of claims of securities fraud based on forward-looking
statements that fail to rise to the level of a guarantee. See Isquith v. Middle S. Utils., Inc., 847
F.2d 186, 203 (5th Cir. 1988) ("Courts in the past have consistently recognized that a defendant
does not place itself beyond the reach of the securities laws merely by disclosing information
that is forward-looking in nature.").
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These courts' decisions fail to distinguish forward-looking
statements that are too vague to support a securities fraud claim from
forward-looking statements that fail to rise to the level of a guarantee
of future performance. While facially vague statements can look to
future performance, not every forward-looking statement is vague, as
some forward-looking statements may be sufficiently specific to
induce the reliance of the markets. 59 Many courts have overlooked
this distinction in their analysis. 60 Whereas evidence could prove
current opinions arguably to be false, plaintiffs should have the
opportunity at least to prove the fraudulent nature of the opinion
before every forward-looking statement not rising to the Fourth
Circuit's high threshold is dismissed on a motion to dismiss or on
summary judgment.61
C. The Contextual Standard
The judicial efficiency gained by determining a statement's
actionability in the abstract makes the vagueness standard and
Guarantee Standard seductive; however, the boundary between
puffery and actionable fraud is often more elusive than a cursory
examination of syntax would reveal. When corporate statements
contain specific language, investors' reliance is more probable, and
reasonable investors could disagree as to whether the statement
materially affected a security's price. At this point, courts should no
longer decide statements are immaterial as a matter of law.
Furthermore, even a statement that appears to be facially vague,
could, in the proper context, provide reliable information to the
market and could be deemed material in the context of all information
available to the market. In short, the Corporate Puffery Defense
requires a more contextual methodology to determine which corporate
statements can support a securities fraud claim and which statements
are nothing more than mere puffery. As the method used by Raab
and its progeny62 excludes some vague statements that could, under
59. See, for example, the earnings estimate in In re Burlington Coat Factory Securities
Litigation, 114 F.3d 1410, 1427 (3d Cir. 1997).
60. See, e.g., Herman, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 5568, at *13-14 (holding that forward-looking
statements that do not constitute a guarantee are immaterial as a matter of law); Malone, 26
F.3d at 479; Hillson Partners, 42 F.3d at 211-12; Raab, 4 F.3d at 289-90.
61. See Raab, 4 F.3d at 289-90 (quoting Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S.
1083, 1090-95 (1991)).
62. See supra Part II.A (discussing cases that determine immateriality solely on the
specificity of language used in the corporate statement, absent the context of the information
available to the market).
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certain circumstances, induce a reasonable reliance by the markets,
this Note recommends a more contextual application of the Corporate
Puffery Defense.
A few insightful courts have applied such a Contextual
Standard, rather than stringent categorical rules, to evaluate corpo-
rate puffing statements. 63 In Shaw v. Digital Equipment Corp., the
63. The Fifth Circuit uses such a Contextual Standard to govern its application of the
Corporate Puffery Defense, although its contextual analysis has been overlooked. The language
from the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Krim v. BancTexas, 989 F.2d 1435 (5th Cir. 1993), is often
cited by the Fourth Circuit to support the per se immateriality of forward-looking statements
that fail to rise to the level of a guarantee. See, e.g., Herman, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 5568, at
*13-*14 (4th Cir. Mar. 20, 1995) (adopting language supporting the Guarantee Standard from
Krim, 989 F.2d at 1446, as set forth in Malone, Raab and Hillson Partners); Malone, 26 F.3d at
479 (same as set forth in Raab); Hillson Partners, 42 F.3d at 211-12 (same as set forth by Raab
and Malone); Raab, 4 F.3d at 289-90 (same as set forth in Krim). The Krim court, however,
actually considered the corporate statements in the context in which they were presented. The
Krim court considered each one of the defendant's statements that the plaintiff alleged to have
been false or misleading in the context in which they were made and found each one to be
incapable of serving as a basis for a claim of securities fraud. See Krim, 98 F.2d at 1447-50.
While the court recognized that future projections generally are not actionable, id. at 1446
(citing Friedman v. Mohasco Corp., 929 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1991), and Hershfang v. Citicorp, 767 F.
Supp. 1251 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), as examples supporting the Guarantee Standard), the court stopped
short of adopting a per se rule.
A Fifth Circuit district court further expanded this contextual analysis in In re Browning-
Ferris Industries, Inc. Securities Litigation. 876 F. Supp. 870 (S.D. Tex. 1995). In that case, the
court denied actionability for management's projections of growth because they were opinions
that no reasonable investor would have interpreted to be a guarantee or assurance that the
specified levels of growth would be attained. See id. at 881-82. The opinions indicate that the
Fifth Circuit evaluates puffing statements in the context in which they were made. See Krim,
989 F.2d at 1448 ("Materiality is not judged in the abstract, but in light of the surrounding
circumstances.").
In Gilford Partners, L.P. v. Sensormatic Electronics Corp., the court reiterated the Seventh
Circuit's denial of per se immateriality of corporate puffing statements. No. 96 C 4072, 1997
WL 757495, at *14 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 24, 1997) (citing Stransky v. Cummins Eugine Co., 51 F.3d
1329, 1332-33 (7th Cir. 1995)). The Gilford Partners court went on to consider the defendant's
puffing statements in the context of the information available to the market in discussing part
of the plaintiffs' claim on summary judgment. See id. ("Assuming Sensormatics' difficulties with
its European sales, poor sales and negative cash flow, these vague statements cannot be
considered materially misleading."). The court, however, found that defendant's statements
that included "projections of annual increases in revenues, quantified predictions of overall
revenue increases, and finally, specific projections for increases in earnings per share" within
"fairly specific time frames" could not be characterized as mere puffery. Id. (citing Searls v.
Glasser, 64 F.3d 1061, 1067 (7th Cir. 1995)).
Similarly, in Schaffer v. Timberland Co., a district court recognized the Vagueness Standard
and rejected the Guarantee Standard. 924 F. Supp. 1298, 1313-14 (D.N.H. 1996). The court
recognized the difficulty in distinguishing between actionable predictions and vague optimism
or puffery. See id. at 1314. The court stated that although predictions about future events are
inherently uncertain, they are not exempt from claims of securities fraud. See id. at 1313; cf.
Herman, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 5568, at *13-*14; Hillson Partners, 42 F.3d at 211-12; Malone,
26 F.3d at 479; Raab, 4 F.3d at 289-90 (all implying that because future events are uncertain,
forward-looking statements are generally exempt from securities laws). The Schaffer court
instead made an ad hoc determination of the immateriality of the statements in the context of
the overall pleadings. See Schaffer, 924 F. Supp. at 1314. Rather than putting the statements
in the context of the information available to the market during the class period, the Schaffer
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First Circuit accepted the viability of the vague statement analysis
but explicitly refused to adopt an absolute rule preventing expressions
of corporate optimism from supporting a private securities fraud
claim.64 While admitting that the materiality requirement of securi-
ties fraud actions must be reserved for the fact-finder in most circum-
stances,65 the Shaw court recognized that some statements are so
vague, so general, or so loosely optimistic, they clearly are the speak-
ers' opinions and "no reasonable investor could find them important to
the total mix of information available."66 The court in Shaw consid-
ered the statement in the context of all other information available to
the market. 67 The Shaw court reasoned that investor claims under
court based its decision on the information available to the defendants. See id.; cf Shaw v.
Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1217-18 (1st Cir. 1996) (evaluating corporate puffery on the
basis of all the information available to the market). In this respect, Schaffer departs
significantly from the immateriality standard applied by all other jurisdictions. See Krim, 989
F.2d at 1447-50 (subjectively determining materiality based on the point of view of either the
market or a reasonable investor, and not the defendant, as in Schaffer). In fact, considering the
information available to the defendants, rather than that available to the market, seemingly
contradicts the Schaffer court's own analysis. See Schaffer, 924 F. Supp. at 1313 (indicating
that the Schaffer court was evaluating corporate statements in the context of the "eyes of the
investing public" and that dismissal should be based on whether a "reasonable investor may
have relied on the predictions"). Why the Schaffer court would attempt to determine whether a
forward-looking statement is specific enough to affect financial markets by examining what
information the defendants had knowledge of is unclear. Such analysis, while valuable for
determining scienter, is utterly irrelevant to a determination of materiality. See infra Part IIIA
& III.C (distilling materiality to the ability to affect market regardless of veracity).
64. 82 F.3d 1194, 1218 (1st Cir. 1996).
65. See id. at 1217 (citing Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 236 (1988)).
66. Id. (footnotes and examples omitted). In Shaw, the court held that press releases by
the chief financial officer stating that "its Alpha chip products sales [were] 'going reasonably
well' and that the company 'should show progress quarter over quarter, year over year,'" were
not actionable because of their patent immateriality. Id. at 1219. The court also found
statements by the CEO "that the company 'was basically on track'"; that "DEC was a very
healthy company"; and that he was "confident that DEC was pursuing the right strategy" and
statements by DEC's head of European Operations that he was " 'pretty optimistic' that the
company would 'be able to stabilize [its] revenue' in the first half of the calendar year 1994 and
'start to grow revenue' in the second half,'" to be immaterial as a matter of law. Id. The court
specifically limited the applicability of the puffery doctrine to cases where "the statements
[were] outside of the registration statement and prospectus." Id. at 1218-19. The Shaw court
also analogized the Corporate Puffery Defense to puffery under the common law of fraud where
courts would find" 'puffing' or sales talk upon which no reasonable person could rely.., legally
insufficient to support a claim." Id. at 1217 n.32 (examples omitted).
67. In this regard, the Contextual Standard most closely approximates the contextual
inquiry applied under the Bespeaks Caution Doctrine. The Bespeaks Caution Doctrine and a
contextual application of the Corporate Puffery Defense seek the same determination-how a
reasonable investor would be affected by the statements considering the context in which the
statement was made. Compare Rubenstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 160, 167 (5th Cir. 1994) ("[T]he
'bespeaks caution' doctrine merely reflects the unremarkable proposition that statements must
be analyzed in context."), with Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1217 (evaluating vague corporate statements in
the context of the information available to the market).
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the fraud-on-the-market doctrine68 will not withstand judicial scrutiny
when based on vague statements which the market recognizes as
nothing more than mere corporate puffery.69 Thus, the Shaw stan-
dard evaluates the statement contextually by determining whether
the market viewed the information as significantly altering the total
mix of information available.70
In Simon v. American Power Conversion Corp., the First
Circuit refined this contextual test.71 The Simon court found the
CEO's statements recognizing the company's presence in newly
emerging markets, noting the company's improved manufacturing
efficiencies, 72 acknowledging opportunities to expand its product line,73
and announcing that the upcoming year was going to be a busy one 74
to be nothing more than corporate cheerleading.7 5 As in Shaw, the
First Circuit held that the statements constituted nonactionable
corporate puffing under the Contextual Standard.7 6 The Simon court,
however, found that other statements cited in securities analysts'
reports and a 10-Q filing could not be characterized as similar "rosy
affirmations" that would be so easily dismissed by the market.77
According to Simon, these statements contributed to the total mix of
information available so as to influence a reasonable investor's
decision and, as a result, could not be dismissed as immaterial as a
matter of law73
68. For a discussion of the fraud-on-the-market theory, see infra notes 134-40 and
accompanying text.
69. Specifically, the court stated, "[tihe market is not so easily duped, even granted that
individual investors sometimes are." Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1218 (citing In re Apple Computer Sec.
Litig., 886 F.2d 1104, 1114 (9th Cir. 1989); Wielgos v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 892 F.2d 509,
515 (7th Cir. 1989)). The Shaw court made a clear distinction between the reasonable investor,
by whom materiality must be gauged, and the market, by which claims of fraud on the market
must be gauged. See id. (citing In re Verifone Sec. Litig., 784 F. Supp. 1471, 1479 (N.D. Cal.
1992)) (stating that the fraud-on-the-market theory "shifts the inquiry from whether an
individual investor was fooled to whether the market as a whole was fooled").
70. See id. at 1217-18.
71. 945 F. Supp. 416 (D.R.I. 1996).
72. See id. at 428.
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. See id. The company released the statements in press releases, financial analysts'
reports, a 10-Q filing to the SEC, and a shareholder meeting. See id. at 433-34.
76. See id. at 428-29.
77. The Simon court specifically stated that there could be "little doubt that reasonable
investors could take information in analysts' reports into consideration when making invest-
ment decisions." Id. at 429. Therefore, the court determined the market would have factored
the information in these reports "into the equation when setting the price of APC's stock." Id.
78. See id. In addition to the statements contained in analysts' reports and a 10-Q, the
Simon court also considered a statement in a July 3 Home Furnishing Network article stating
that APC had "stepped-up production in anticipation of Windows 95," id. at 433, as well as
statements during a shareholder meeting that the company was outshipping a major competitor
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III. ANALYSIS OF IMMATERIALITY OF FORWARD-LOOKING STATEMENTS
AS A MATTER OF LAW
A. Materiality Under Case Law Interpreting Rule 10b-5
Since courts are dismissing private securities fraud claims
because the forward-looking statements are immaterial as a matter of
law, any justifiable application of the Corporate Puffery Defense must
be consistent with the standard of materiality developed under securi-
ties jurisprudence. Therefore, the first paradigm under which the
competing standards of the Corporate Puffery Defense will be ana-
lyzed is their consistency with the benchmarks of materiality courts
developed under case law interpreting Rule 10b-5.79 This analysis
compares the three competing views of the Corporate Puffery Defense
with the definition of materiality proscribed in Basic v. Levinson and
the heightened inferences of materiality when there is a duty to speak
the truth in Virginia Bankshares v. Sandberg.
1. The Definition of Materiality
The Supreme Court clearly articulated the standard for deter-
mining materiality of historical corporate statements in Basic v.
Levinson. ° In Basic, the plaintiffs claimed a corporate official's denial
of preliminary merger negotiations constituted securities frauds1 The
Basic Court considered whether the corporate statements were
sufficiently material to support the claim.82 The Court found the
information to be material because a reasonable investor would view
the statement as significantly altering the "total mix of information
available.""' The Court discussed the previous standard for determin-
"by as much as 460 to 1" and that the company's "high inventory levels.., were required to
meet swelling demand." Id. at 432.
79. See supra note 7 (describing the necessary elements of securities fraud under Rule
10b-5, which was promulgated under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act).
80. 485 U.S. 224(1988).
81. See id. at 225.
82. See id. at 230.
83. Id. at 231-32 (applying the materiality standard for proxy solicitation, defined in TSC
Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976), to the materiality requirement
necessary for securities fraud claims. TSC Industries defined the standard to be whether "there
is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding
how to vote"). Therefore, materiality depends upon a balancing of the probability that an event
will occur and the anticipated magnitude of the event, considering total company activity.




ing the materiality of preliminary merger negotiations,84 finding any
method that only considered a single fact as determinative of an
"inherently fact-specific finding such as materiality, must necessarily
be over- or underinclusive."85
Just as the Basic Court rejected a bright line test for the mate-
riality of preliminary merger negotiations, courts considering a
motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment should hesitate
before applying a bright line test to determine that forward-looking
corporate statements should be deemed puffery. Both the Vagueness
Standard and the Guarantee Standard use a bright line test, as both
standards limit the judicial inquiry to the language used in the
forward-looking statements and ignore the total mix of information
available to the market. Conversely, the Contextual Standard of the
Corporate Puffery Defense is consistent with the Basic philosophy of a
contextual inquiry into materiality because it considers the impact of
the statement on the total mix of information available to the
market.86
Critics of the Contextual Standard may argue that the purpose
of immateriality as a matter of law is to put the materiality question
in the hands of the judiciary, avoiding the lengthy and costly
discovery process associated with determining materiality at trial.
The contextual nature of the materiality inquiry described in Basic,
however, suggests that courts should nonetheless avoid using over-
simplified bright line tests, such as Vagueness or Guarantee
Standards, as the sole means by which to determine materiality as a
matter of law.87  Although courts should continue to dismiss
statements that are immaterial as a matter of law, they should
expand their inquiry beyond the specificity of the particular language
and instead consider the language's probable effect on the market.
84. Under a test used by the Third Circuit, preliminary merger negotiations were not
considered material until the parties had reached an "agreement-in-principle" as to the price
and structure of the transaction contemplated. Basic, 485 U.S. at 239 (citing Greenfield v.
Heublin, Inc., 742 F.2d 751, 757 (3d. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1215 (1985)).
85. Id.; Wallace v. Systems & Computer Tech. Corp., No. Civ. A. 95-CV-6303, 1997 WL
602808, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 1997) ("When assessing materiality, the court should not only
consider the statement or omission itself.., but also the context in which it occurs.") (citations
omitted).
86. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text (describing the contextual nature of the
Basic holding).
87. See infra notes 196-204. As shown by Shaw and Simon, the Contextual Standard does
not require the extensive discovery process required for a securities fraud trial. See Shaw v.
Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1217 (1st Cir. 1996); Simon v. American Power Conversion
Corp., 945 F. Supp. 416, 428-29 (D.R.I. 1996) (discussing securities fraud class action utilizing a
contextual standard without resorting to the full blown discovery required for a trial).
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Despite its insight regarding materiality, the Basic Court
specifically declined to address the materiality requirements of
forward-looking information.88  This lack of direction from the
Supreme Court has led to the aforementioned competing standards
for determining the materiality of forward-looking statements among
the circuits.89 Thus, although the Basic decision provides insight into
the need for a contextual inquiry into materiality, it does not defini-
tively require the same analysis for forward-looking statements.90
2. Materiality when a Duty Exists
The vast majority of securities litigation stems from the state-
ments of corporate officials or official corporate statements. 91 The
Supreme Court addressed the inherent importance of corporate offi-
cials' statements of opinions in Virginia Bankshares v. Sandberg, in
which the Court evaluated the Board of Directors' statements
claiming that a merger plan they approved provided shareholders
88. Basic, 485 U.S. at 232 n.9 (generally referring to the definitions and distinctions
between hard and soft information found in Hiler, supra note 1); see also Louis Lowenstein,
Financial Transparency and Corporate Governance: You Manage what You Measure, 96 COLUM.
L. REV. 1335, 1355 (1996) (stating that the market places an "enormous emphasis" on earnings
reports).
89. Although forward-looking information is often material, determining its materiality is
often difficult. See Joel Seligman, The SEC's Unfinished Soft Information Revolution, 63
FORDHAM L. REv. 1953, 1977-81 (1995) (surveying differing interpretations of the actionablility
of soft information among the circuits); compare Raab v. General Physics Corp., 4 F.3d 286, 290
(4th Cir. 1993) (finding vague forward-looking statements immaterial and therefore inactionable
as a matter of law), with In re Apple Computer Sec. Litig., 886 F.2d 1109, 1114-15 (9th Cir.
1989) (finding predictive opinions or beliefs actionable).
90. Basic, 485 U.S. at 232 n.9. Some commentators, however, have suggested that courts
should apply the Basic test to forward-looking information. See, e.g., JAMES D. Cox ET AL.,
SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 71 (2d ed. 1997) (suggesting the probabil-
ity/magnitude test from Basic should be applied to forward-looking information despite the
Basic court's failure to explicitly so hold).
91. A few cases consider statements of analysts attributable to the corporation under the
entanglement doctrine. See, e.g., Rubenstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 160, 168-69 (5th Cir. 1994)
(holding corporation's statement that analysts' estimates were "realistic" enough to be
actionable); Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 163 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding
corporation liable for misrepresentations made by an analyst when the corporation "sufficiently
entangled itself with the analysts' forecasts to render those predictions 'attributable to it' ");
Schaffer v. Timberland Co., 924 F. Supp. 1298, 1314-15 (D.N.H. 1996) (finding no difference
between a corporate official stating earnings would be five dollars per share and a corporate
official expressing comfort with, adopting, or ratifying an analyst's statement that earnings will
be five dollars per share). The scope of this Note is limited to evaluating the forward-looking
statements released by the corporation's officers, directors, internal public relations
departments, outside public relations firms, or other such designated representatives and,
therefore, does not address the entanglement doctrine.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
with a high share value.92 The Court held that such statements by
directors are material because directors have knowledge and expertise
that exceed the normal investor's resources. 93 The directors' superior
position magnifies their duty to act in the shareholders' interests.94
In Virginia Bankshares, the Court considered the directors'
statements material although they were mere opinions. 95  This
standard justifies investor or market reliance regardless of whether
the corporate statements rise to the level of a guarantee. Therefore,
the Guarantee Standard is utterly inconsistent with the holding and
inquiry into materiality established in Virginia Bankshares. The
Contextual Standard is more consonant with the Court's holding in
Virginia Bankshares because it recognizes the value that investors
place on any corporate official's statements where the official has
superior access to corporate information. Such officials have a higher
duty to speak the truth when they choose to make disclosures
regarding future corporate performance.96 Therefore, an inquiry into
an authoritative statement's impact on the totality of information
available to the market is superior to standards that merely examine
the corporate language in the abstract. Thus, notions of materiality
developed by the Supreme Court's interpretations of Rule 10b-5 in
Basic and Virginia Bankshares indicate that the contextual
interpretation of the Corporate Puffery Defense is superior to both the
Vagueness Standard and Guarantee Standard, which limit their
inquiries to bright line tests and ignore the context of statements.
92. 501 U.S. 1083, 1090 (1991). Although the Court evaluated the reasonableness of the
investor's reliance in the context of a Rule 14(a) violation of proxy statement disclosure, the
standard of reliance is equally applicable to Rule 10b-5 violations. The SEC promulgated Rule
14(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1997), pursuant to section 14(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78n(a). Rule 14(a) prohibits the use of false or misleading information in a proxy statement.
93. See Virginia Bankshares, 501 U.S. at 1090.
94. See id. at 1090-91.
95. See id. at 1093-94; see also In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410,
1428 (3d Cir. 1997) ("[Sitatement of opinion may be actionable."); Glassman v. Computervision
Corp., 90 F.3d 617, 627 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding half-truths may be actionable); In re Donald J.
Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d 357, 372 & n.14 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding statements of opinion
are actionable). The Virginia Bankshares Court stated that "a statement of belief by corporate
directors about a recommended course of action, or an explanation of their reasons for recom-
mending it," would be so important that a "reasonable shareholder would consider it important
in deciding how to vote." Virginia Bankshares, 501 U.S. at 1090-91; see also In re Apple
Computer Sec. Litig., 886 F.2d 1109, 1113 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating that management projections
or opinions contained factual assertions that may be actionable, as investors were reasonable in
relying on the directors' good faith). But see Barrios v. Paco Pharm. Servs., Inc., 816 F. Supp.
243, 251 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (stating that "it is well settled in this and a number of other
jurisdictions that future presentations such as contained in the [private placement memoran-
dum] are not statements of material fact on which an investor can rely").
96. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text (describing the Virginia Bankshares
holding).
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B. Materiality Under the Commercial Common Law
Courts derived the Corporate Puffery Defense from the concept
of puffery created under the commercial common law of fraud.97
Despite some differences between commercial common law and
securities law,9 courts have found it useful to apply the puffery
concept, originally developed under the commercial common law, to
private securities fraud litigation.99
Under the commercial common law, puffing consists of general,
indefinite statements'0° of the seller's opinion that the buyer should
discount or ignore, as no reasonable person would rely on such
97. The commercial common law and securities law share a common ancestry. Certain
basic principles of law are prevalent in both commercial common law and securities regulation.
See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227-28 (1980) (comparing common law fraud to
securities fraud); SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 192-95 (1963)
(comparing commercial common law fraud to securities fraud); see also LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra
note 1, at 3431-48 (comparing common law fraud to securities fraud). In spite of the recent
number and breadth of cases recognizing a puffery defense, commentators continue to maintain
that the applicability of the puffery doctrine is not a point of commonality between commercial
common law fraud and securities fraud. See id. at 3434-37.
98. Courts developed the commercial common law doctrine of fraud and deceit primarily
to govern the sale of tangible items. Therefore, sales of intangibles, such as securities, did not
easily fit within the commercial common law. See Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. at
194 (recognizing that the doctrines of fraud and deceit are ill-suited to the sale of securities); see
also Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972) (citing with
approval Capital Gains Research Bureau, which stated that the securities laws replaced phi-
losophy of caveat.emptor with philosophy of full disclosure); B. Fennekohl & Co., 41 S.E.C. 210,
216 (1962) (noting that the "concept of 'puffing' is derived from the doctrine of caveat emptor
and.., can have little application to the merchandising of securities"); LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra
note 1, at 3434-40. This inapplicability derives in part from the different price formation
mechanisms of real goods and financial goods. See Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Frauds,
Markets, and Fraud-on-the-Market: The Tortured Transition of Justifiable Reliance from Deceit
to Securities Fraud, 49 U. MIAMI L. REv. 671, 677-96 (1995) (detailing the contrasting economic
implications of common law deceit and securities fraud to argue for different thresholds of
reliance). Furthermore, the commercial common law of fraud is based on caveat emptor,
Fennekohl, 41 S.E.C. at 216, whereas the drafters of the securities laws explicitly shifted the
focus of the markets from caveat emptor to full disclosure. See Capital Gains Research Bureau,
375 U.S. at 186 (citing H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 2 (1933)); supra notes 25-26. In fact, Congress
drafted securities laws to protect investors where the commercial common law fraud doctrines
failed to do so. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 388-89 (1983) (citing
Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. at 186). The recently enacted Reform Act, however,
shifts away from this fundamental purpose, adding a caveat emptor element to securities
regulation by providing a statutory safe harbor for forward-looking statements to balance the
protections the securities laws otherwise give investors. See BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 13, at
848. In this sense, comparison between the commercial common law and securities law is
perhaps even more appropriate.
99. See supra note 31 (citing cases that have used the Corporate Puffery Defense to
dismiss securities fraud claims as a matter of law).
100. See BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 13, at 756; see also Independent Order of Foresters v.
Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 149, 152 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (implying that puff-
ery is an expression of judgment about a thing to which both parties can be expected to have an
opinion).
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statements. 1 1 These statements include relative terms, which may
mean anything the speaker or the listener wants.10 2 Thus, the
common law of fraud does not protect parties who rely on such vague
statements, reflecting the idea that the speaker should not be
penalized because of her exaggeration or the listener's disappoint-
ment.10 3 In a commercial context, a buyer who relies on puffing state-
ments assumes the risk of loss, which commercial common law
defines as the difference between the seller's overstatement and a
reasonable value of the item. 10 4  The puffery concept under the
commercial common law recognizes that a statement of opinion
indicates the speaker either has some doubt about the facts of which
she speaks or is merely expressing personal judgment.0 5 As long as
the facts do not mislead the listener, the listener has no justification
for relying on the speaker's judgment.06
In the typical commercial common law case where the speaker
makes assurances of specific facts, the jury decides whether the
speaker is liable for misrepresentation. 17 The judge, however, can
determine that the statement lacks specificity before submitting the
factual question to the jury and may dismiss the claim as inactionable
puffery. 08 Such dismissal as a matter of law precludes the jury from
hearing the case; therefore, no one ever determines whether the
statement was intentionally false. This construct leads some
commentators to characterize the puffing doctrine as "the seller's
privilege to lie his head off, so long as he says nothing specific." 0 9
101. See BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 13, at 757.
102. See Bertram v. Reed Automobile Co., 49 S.W.2d 517, 518 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932); see,
e.g., Greenery Rehabilitation Group, Inc., v. Antaramian, 628 N.E.2d 1291, 1293 (Mass. App. Ct.
1994) (finding that "it would be very hard, even with the intendments favoring the plaintiffs, to
raise from [the puffing statements] any implications of falsity upon which there could have been
reasonable reliance").
103. See BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 13, at 755-58.
104. See id. at 757 (citing Fowler v. Harper and Mary Coate McNeely, A Synthesis of the
Law of Misrepresentation, 22 MINN. L. REv. 939, 1004 (1938)). This loss is similar to the
measure of damages in private securities litigation. See infra note 136 (describing the
calculation of damages under the fraud-on-the-market theory).
105. Personal judgment typically includes matters such as quality, value, or authenticity.
See KEETON ET AL., supra note 11, at 755; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538
(1977) (stating that facts are material if a reasonable person would attach importance in de-
termining his course of action).
106. See KEETON ETAL., supra note 11, at 755.
107. See id. at 757 n.29 (citing cases).
108. See LensCrafters, Inc. v. Vision World, Inc., 943 F. Supp. 1481, 1489 (D. Minn. 1996)
(citing Cook, Perkiss & Liehe v. Northern Cal. Collection Serv., Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 246 (9th Cir.
1990)).
109. Castrol, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 987 F.2d 939, 945 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 11, at 757). While perhaps simplistic, this observation provides significant insight
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The Vagueness Standard10 of the Corporate Puffery Defense is
very similar to this commercial common law theory of puffery.", Both
doctrines support the speaker's right to lie. Unlike specific forward-
looking statements, which may affect market price, clear puffing
statements, by their very definition from commercial common law, do
not affect the markets due to their lack of specificity."2 Since these
puffing statements do not affect the markets, the fact they were made
without a reasonable basis or in bad faith is irrelevant."3 Therefore, a
factual inquiry into the corporation's basis for making the statements,
or good faith, is unnecessary. Under these circumstances, judges, as a
matter of law, dismiss all claims based on clear statements of
puffery."4 To do otherwise would place unwarranted restraints on the
corporate officials' natural optimism."5
The commercial common law, however, adopts an entirely
different position for specific forward-looking statements." 6 Where
the speaker claims to have special knowledge of facts that would
justify the creation of expectation,"17 where the parties do not have
into evaluating the desirability of a Corporate Puffery Defense. See infra Part III.C (discussing
the irrelevance of puffing statements on the market price of a security).
110. To the extent that the Contextual Standard considers the vagueness of the language
used in the corporate statement, whether implicitly as in Shaw, or explicitly as in the methodol-
ogy suggested in Part IV, the similiarity of the commercial common law puffery doctrine extends
to the Contextual Standard as well as the Vagueness Standard.
111. See Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1217 n.32 (1st Cir. 1996) (viewing the
Chief Financial Officer's claims in the same light as sales talk or mere puffery that is just as
insufficient to support a securities fraud claim as a common law fraud claim); Simon v.
American Power Conversion Corp., 945 F. Supp. 416, 426-27 (D.R.I. 1996) (drawing parallels
between common law puffery and the Corporate Puffery Defense) (citing Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1217
n.32).
112. Thus, puffing statements may be grouped into the category of nonfundamental
information that have no impact on a fundamental valuation of the company.
113. See Fisher v. Acuson Corp., No. 93-20477, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19968, at *7 (N.D.
Cal. Apr. 26, 1995) (holding statements are not actionable unless they "significantly alter the
total mix of information available to investors").
114. See id.
115. That is, one should not be concerned about a market flooded with falsely optimistic,
vague forward-looking statements when an abundance of fundamental information subject to
disclosure requirements exists that either supports their validity or attests to less spectacular
expectations. One should be concerned only about the forward-looking corporate statements
that influence the markets.
116. Where forward-looking statements are specific, the puffing doctrine will not apply and
one must look to the commercial common law treatment of statements where the speaker has a
duty to speak the truth. Courts hearing private securities fraud claims would be wise to follow
suit.
117. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 11, at 760. Such is the case with corporate officers who
have exclusive access to internal forecasts that are not disclosed to the general public. The
implication is that the speaker not only does not know information to the contrary, but also
knows facts that justify the forecasts. See Hayes Constr. Co. v. Silverthorn, 72 N.W.2d 190, 193
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equal access to information,118 or where the parties are in a special
relationship of trust and confidence that justifies reliance, the
common law interpretation breaks down."9 These circumstances
justify reliance on the opinion of the speaker, and courts typically will
grant relief.120  Thus, while the common law seeks to protect those
who make vague statements, it does not always protect those who
make predictions of future events. This treatment of forward-looking
statements under commercial common law provides a useful reference
point with which to compare the judicial treatment of specific
forward-looking statements made by corporate officials who have a
duty to speak the truth in their voluntary corporate forward-looking
disclosures. 121
In addition, the commercial common law carves out an excep-
tion to protection of statements when a duty exists between the
transacting parties. Although corporate officials have no duty to dis-
close financial projections or forward-looking statements, 1 22 once they
elect to disclose, they do have a duty to speak the complete truth. 23
Corporate officials not only must have a reasonable basis for making
such projections, but also must present their "good faith, best esti-
mate" when disclosing predictions.24 The existence of this duty war-
rants a factual inquiry into the corporation's reasonable basis and
good faith in making a statement. 25 Applying the treatment of for-
ward-looking statements under the commercial common law of fraud
to the securities context would render inquiries into the corporation's
veracity a standard judicial procedure.
The Guarantee Standard of the Corporate Puffery Defense is
contrary to commercial common law treatment of specific forward-
looking statements. The commercial common law implies that reli-
ance may be reasonable when the speaker has exclusive
(Mich. 1955). In securities fraud claims, plaintiffs often allege that the corporate insiders
possessed information contrary to the publicly disclosed statements.
118. See KEETONETAL., supra note 11, at 761.
119. See id. at 760.
120. See id.
121. See supra notes 92-95.
122. See Regulation S-K, Item 303, 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (1997) ("Registrants are encour-
aged, but not required, to supply forward-looking information.").
123. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 861-62 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc)
(holding that a corporation's management has the duty to ascertain the truth of statements
released to the public).
124. See Barondes, supra note 10, at 277-78. The fiduciary relationship between corporate
officers and shareholders triggers this duty to disclose the truth. A corporate official's duty of
disclosure is "derivative of the duties of care and loyalty." Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc.,
663 A-2d 1156, 1166 (Del. 1995).
125. See In re Apple Computer Sec. Litig., 886 F.2d 1109, 1113 (9th Cir. 1989).
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information.126 Reliance may be even more reasonable in the corpo-
rate context where the public presumes that corporate officials have
knowledge of all relevant information. 127 Thus, where corporate offi-
cials have either superior access to financial information regarding
the corporation or experience with the corporation, their specific
predictions of the future economic performance of the corporation are
material.1 28  Therefore, the comparison of securities law to the
commercial common law yields support for the Vagueness Standard
yet rejects application of the Guarantee Standard.
C. Materiality and Modern Financial Theory
A court's determination of materiality is really a judicial proxy
for a determination that the market relied on the forward-looking
statement in valuing the price of a security. 29 The financial markets'
interpretation of a corporation's forward-looking statement is the true
test of that statement's informative value. Therefore, this modern
financial theory and its application to securities jurisprudence is a
critical element in analyzing whether forward-looking statements
could have an effect on the market price of a security and are,
therefore, material. An inquiry into the value of forward-looking
corporate statements begins with the market's treatment of corporate
information in the context of the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis
("ECMH).13 The ECMH, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, 31
126. See supra notes 107-24 and accompanying text (describing the standards required for
fraud under the common law).
127. See Barondes, supra note 10, at 277-78.
128. See Langevoort, supra note 10, at 495. In addition, experienced corporate officials
possess a history of prior disclosures upon which reasonable investors can judge the accuracy of
their predictions. See id. at 496.
129. While the actual fundamental efficiency of the markets is unlikely to be absolute, the
materiality requirements the courts use should be sufficiently similar to the definition of fun-
damental information to indicate an intent to protect only the market's reliance on fundamental
factors. See In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1425 (3d Cir. 1997); Ian
Ayers, Back to Basics: Regulating How Corporations Speak to the Market, 77 VA. L. REV. 945,
973 n.107 (1991) (noting the similarity between concepts of materiality and fundamental
information) (citing TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)).
An assumption of incongruity between material information and fundamental information
recognizes that investors, and possibly the markets, rely on nonfundamental information. The
protection of such reliance on nonfundamental information, however, could result in investment
insurance, which is not the intent of the securities laws. See Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224,
252 (1988) (White, J., dissenting). Thus, a regulatory scheme that overprotects traders who rely
on nonfundamental information perpetuates any inefficiences present in modern securities
markets.
130. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency,
70 VA. L. REV. 549, 550 (1984) ("In short, the ECMH is now the context in which serious discus-
sion of the regulation of financial markets takes place."). Legal circles quickly adopted the
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states that in an open securities market, the material information
regarding the company and its business determines a company's stock
price.1 2 Accordingly, the stock's market price will also incorporate
fraudulent statements that the market is unable to distinguish from
accurate statements. 133
Due to the judicial application of the ECMH to securities fraud
jurisprudence, a plaintiff alleging securities fraud need not show
actual individual reliance on the corporate statements when they
ECMH, first articulated in Eugene Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and
Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970), although it was not easily understood. See id. Since
then, the validity, applicability, and policy implications of efficient markets has been the subject
of a great deal of literature. See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel & David J. Ross, Should the Law
Prohibit "Manipulation" in Financial Markets?, 105 HARV. L. REv. 503 (1991) (discussing the
difficulties of manipulating efficient markets); Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions,
and Securities Regulation: Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 851 (1992)
(discussing the use of the ECMH in securities regulation); Paul G. Mahoney, Precaution Costs
and the Law of Fraud in Impersonal Markets, 78 VA. L. REV. 623 (1992) (discussing the use of
ECMH in fraud-on-the-market cases and rejecting the use of the fraud-on-the-market theory as
an alternative to proving reliance for securities fraud); Andrew R. Simmonds et al., Dealing with
Anomalies, Confusion and Contradiction in Fraud on the Market Securities Class Actions, 81
KY. L.J. 123, 142-45 (1992-93) (citing empirical research criticizing ECMH).
131. Commentators continue to debate whether the Court's application of the ECMH to the
fraud-on-the-market theory is entirely consistent with the financial realities of the market. See,
e.g., Ayers, supra note 129 (finding faults with Macey and Miller's 1990 application of ECMH
and fraud-on-the-market to securities regulation); Daniel R. Fischel, Efficient Capital Markets,
the Crash, and the Fraud on the Market Theory, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 907 (1989) (reconciling the
ECMH with the 1987 market crash); Jonathon R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Fraud-on-
the-Market Theory Revisited, 77 VA. L. REV. 1001 (1991) (discounting Ayer's application of the
ECMH to securities regulation); Jonathon R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Good Finance, Bad
Economics: An Analysis of the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1059 (1990)
(discussing the misapplication of the ECMH by the courts); Newman, Jr. et al., supra note 39, at
583-86 (arguing that fraud on the market is valid only if courts view materiality from the
standpoint of the professional investor).
132. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 241 (quoting Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160-61 (3d Cir.
1986)); In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d at 1425. This view, however, assumes
that markets are informationally efficient only in that the market price reflects all available
material information. See Ayers, supra note 129, at 964-68, 974-75; see Frank H. Easterbrook &
Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 694
(1984) ("So long as informed traders engage in a sufficient amount of searching for information
and bargains, market prices will reflect all publicly available information."). Informational
efficiency is different than fundamental efficiency, in which the market price of the stock
represents the present discounted value of the corporation's expected earnings. See Ayers,
supra note 129, at 970 n.97. One form of efficiency does not imply the other, as the 1987 stock
market crash illustrated. See id. at 974 (stating that the crash showed that the market is not
fundamentally efficient but that the crash did not refute that the market is informationally
efficient).
133. See Daniel R. Fischel, Use of Modern Finance Theory in Securities Fraud Cases
Involving Actively Traded Securities, 38 Bus. LAw. 1, 5 (1982); see also Roger J. Dennis,
Materiality and the Efficient Capital Market Model: A Recipe for the Total Mix, 25 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 373, 390 (1984) ("The relative market price of the stock... will reflect any public
disclosure."). Thus, the markets will price the security at the best, albeit imprecise, estimate of
the present value of the future income stream of the corporation. See Georgakopoulos, supra
note 98, at 713.
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allege there was fraud on the market. Under this fraud-on-the-
market theory, a plaintiff must show only that the statements were in
fact material and that the market as a whole relied on the state-
ments.13 4 Plaintiffs using the theory allege that the corporation or its
agents artificially inflated the price of the security through the
disclosure of false or misleading information. 135 Despite the fact that
plaintiffs may not have been aware of the false or misleading
information, plaintiffs may still seek relief if they purchased the
security at a fraudulently appreciated price and were injured when
the stock price plummeted because of market self-correction for the
misleading information.136
The fraud-on-the-market theory creates a rebuttable pre-
sumption of reliance, relieving plaintiffs of the burden of proving they
personally relied on corporate misstatements.137 This presumption of
reliance permits investors to forego the costly verification procedures
that are otherwise required under the standard reliance doctrine. 138
The defendant may rebut this presumption, however, by showing that
either the plaintiff did not rely on the efficiency of the market to
incorporate information, 139 or the market did not rely on the mis-
134. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 242-44.
135. See id.
136. See id. at 242. Contrary to Justice White's dissent in Basic, see id. at 255 (White, J.,
dissenting), the fraud-on-the-market theory does not justify plaintiffs reliance on the market's
magic ability to determine a true value. See Georgakopoulos, supra note 98, at 715. A plaintiffs
injury in this situation is measured not by the full amount of the price decrease, but instead by
the extent to which loss is attributable to the misstatement. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 245. This
damage measurement reflects the public's interest in having investors assume that a security's
price does not encompass fraudulent information and is not intended to serve as an insurance
policy in the truth of corporate statements or the accuracy of financial markets.
137. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 242-44; Langevoort, supra note 10, at 889-91. Plaintiffs need
only show that the corporation's misstatements induced an artificially high stock price and that
plaintiffs subsequently relied on the price in deciding to purchase the security. See id. This
construct departs from common law fraud, where misstatements injure only those whose actions
were directly influenced by the statements themselves. See Georgakopoulos, supra note 98, at
714-15. The Court's basis for this departure from the common law of fraud is the distinction
between the immense volume of trading done indirectly in the modern securities market and
the face-to-face transactions of the commercial common law. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 244 (quoting
In re LTV Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134, 143 (N.D. Tex. 1980)).
138. See Fischel, supra note 133, at 16; see also GUIDO CALABREsI, THE COSTS OF
AcCDENTs 26-31 (1970) (tort liability prevents wasteful precaution efforts). The persuasiveness
of these economic benefits is limited to the extent that they can be outweighed by the gross
inefficiencies of meritless strike suits. See infra Part V (describing the judicial balancing
required to apply properly the Corporate Puffery Defense from a contextual perspective).
139. See, e.g., Zlotnick v. TIE Communications, 836 F.2d 818, 820-23 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding
that short selling evidences disbelief in the efficiency of the markets, thereby precluding a claim
of fraud on the market). For purposes of this Note this method of rebuttal is not at issue.
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statement.140  Thus, the central focus in determining the actionability
of a forward-looking statement becomes whether the market relied on
the statement.
Without the aid of a judicially efficient statistical model to
determine mathematically the impact of the information on the mar-
ket,14 1 courts must attempt to decide for themselves whether the
140. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 248. The Corporate Puffery Defense is consistent with this
rebuttal, as it argues that the market did not rely on defendant's misstatements because they
were so vague, a reasonable investor would not rely on them in setting the price of the security.
See Raab v. General Physics Corp., 4 F.3d 286, 290 (4th Cir. 1993) (stating that the market does
not rely on vague, indefinite statements of puffery). Like materiality, the presumption of
reliance derived from the fraud-on-the-market theory depends on whether the statement
influenced security prices. See Georgakopoulos, supra note 98, at 727.
141. At first glance, it seems logical to consider the market's determination of a corporate
statement's materiality rather than requiring courts to attempt to determine a particular
statement's influence on the market. See Joseph A. Grundfest, Disimplying Private Rights of
Action Under the Federal Securities Laws: The Commission's Authority, 107 HARV. L. REV. 961,
1013 (1994) (suggesting that the SEC could require a more significant market impact for courts
making a materiality determination); see also In re Fidelity/Micron Sec. Litig., 964 F. Supp. 539,
548 (D. Mass. 1997) ("A simple test of materiality in a fraud-on-the-market case is whether the
alleged misrepresentation in fact affected the market."). Arguably, the most efficient method of'
determining materiality would be to determine, as scientifically as possible, whether the market
actually relied on the language in question. Some commentators have argued that the use of an
event-study methodology would show whether a fraudulent statement has had a significant
effect on the price of a firm's security and, thus, whether the courts would be justified in
presuming reliance on the material statement. See Jonathan R. Macey et al., Lessons from
Financial Economics: Materiality Reliance and Extending the Reach of Basic v. Levinson, 77
VA. L. REV. 1017, 1018 (1991) (arguing for the use of event-study methodology); see also Mark L.
Mitchell & Jeffrey M. Netter, The Role of Financial Economics in Securities Fraud Cases:
Applications at the Securities and Exchange Commission, 49 Bus. LAw. 545, 572-84 (1994)
(describing SEC enforcement of anti-fraud provisions by utilizing the event study methodology).
Courts could compare statistically the price of the stock before and after the disclosure of the
corporate statement to determine whether the market internalized the information and appre-
ciated the stock price. The event-study methodology tests the new information's effect on the
price of a stock for an event period and compares it with the historical deviations of the stock via
a regression analysis. See Macey et al., supra, at 1030-42 (performing an event study). Any
returns existing outside the statistically significant boundaries indicates that information has
been incorporated into the stock price and is, therefore, material. While such an analysis could
predict accurately the materiality of statements, the analysis suffers from difficulties inherent
in practical application. See id. at 1042-44 (describing the difficulty in determining when
information reached the market); see also id. at 1029 (describing how other firm-specific
information eleased at about the same time, i.e., confounding events, would corrupt the study).
Furthermore, while the test is relatively simple for statisticians to administer, it still requires
extensive factual inquiries into the stock's historical performance and the nature of the
corporate statements, as well as the exclusion of confounding events. Courts likely will object to
such a mathematically rigorous and fact-intensive test when deciding an issue as a matter of
law. As a result, some courts have determined that where corporate statements precipitate an
immediate price drop, a jury should determine the issue of materiality. See, eg., In re
Fidelity/Micron, 964 F. Supp. at 547-48 (holding that the issue of materiality is a question of
fact for the jury). This approach oversimplifies the process and forces parties into litigation
when disputes could be resolved more efficiently on a motion to dismiss or on summary
judgment through the judicial application of the Corporate Puffery Defense using the contextual
considerations forwarded in Part V. Cf In re Fidelity/Micron, 964 F. Supp. at 548 (permitting
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statement contains the kind of information the market would value in
determining the price of a security. Since the security's market price
is determined by professional and institutional investors,1 42 many
courts use a "professional investor" standard to determine the
informative value of the corporate statement. 4 3 Given the importance
of market professionals in adjusting the price of a security for a claim
of fraud on the market, the professional investor standard seems most
appropriate in determining whether a forward-looking corporate
statement is sufficiently material to affect the market price of a
security.
The value of rejecting securities fraud claims under either the
Vagueness Standard or the Contextual Standard is especially pro-
nounced when a plaintiff alleges a claim based on fraud on the mar-
ket. Because professional investors set the market price of a
security,1" and these market professionals usually know when to
discount the optimistic rhetoric of corporate officials, they will not
the securities fraud class action to proceed to trial to determine other factors that could have
affected the stock price besides the allegedly misleading corporate statement).
142. See Louis Lowenstein, Pruning Deadwood in Hostile Takeovers: A Proposal for
Legislation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 297 (1983) (discussing professional investors' dominant role
in determining market direction); Macey & Miller, supra note 131, at 1062 (arguing that
"rivalrous competition among market professionals causes share prices to adjust to semi-strong
efficiency"); Simmonds et al., supra note 130, at 132-34 (arguing that individual investor
behavior is irrelevant to the pricing of securities because of the influence wielded by the
professional and institutional investors). See generally Joseph Nocera, Who Really Moves the
Market?, FORTUNE 90 (Oct. 27, 1997) (detailing how professional analysts and investors control
the price of a security).
The fact that mutual funds managers and institutional investors control the vast majority of
the stock market contributes greatly to professional investors' control of security pricing. See
Simmonds et al., supra note 142, at 130 ("Institutional investors and exchange member firms
presently account for about 80% of the shares traded each day on the New York Stock
Exchange."); Randall Smith, Mutual Funds Have Become Dominant Buyers of Stock, WALL ST.
J. C1 (May 22, 1992) (noting increased percentage of assets in professionally managed mutual
funds).
143. See, e.g., Raab, 4 F.3d at 290 (focusing on "analysts and arbitrageurs" to assess alleged
fraud on the market); In re Convergent Techs. Sec. Litig., 948 F.2d at 513 (denying a claim of
fraud on the market where "securities analysts" knew of the risks associated with the security);
In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 832 F. Supp. 948, 976 (W.D. Pa. 1993) (finding that "professional
analysts are generally the first and foremost source of information to the market; their special-
ized ferreting activity is the primary means by which capital markets are made 'efficient,' and
stock prices relatively accurate"); In re Verifone Sec. Litig., 784 F. Supp. 1471, 1479 (N.D. Cal.
1992) ("The professional traders analyze information about securities, and the trading activity of
these knowledgable investors pushes the price of the security toward a value which reflects all
publicly available information."). A necessary condition for this standard is that professional
investors are following the security. In the case of thinly traded securities, which are less
efficiently priced, a reliance on the impact forward-looking statements have on trained profes-
sionals is undeserved. This Note leaves the determination of how many professionals are
required to provide a sufficiently liquid market to other commentators.
144. See supra note 142.
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rely on puffing statements. 145 Since the market professionals do not
rely on puffing statements in determining the stock price, any
allegations by the plaintiff that the statements could have inflated
share value are inconsistent with the fraud-on-the-market theory and
the ECMH.146
The Guarantee Standard poses theoretical difficulties because
of its high threshold when a plaintiff presents a fraud-on-the-market
claim. While the market may not give full credibility to corporate
predictions because of their inherently speculative nature, analysts
could rely on such statements to a limited extent. 41 Corporate
forecasts are often better than projections made by analysts them-
selves, and corporate officers are assumed to have superior access to
corporate information. 148 Therefore, forward-looking statements that
do not rise to the level of a guarantee may be material and may affect
market price. 4 9  The market will consider a forward-looking
statement's relevancy and incorporate it into the market price to the
extent it is likely to come to fruition.10 To assume that professional
investors and sophisticated financial markets treat the relevance of
corporate information as a binary decision based on the statement's
characterization as a guarantee is simply and wholly inaccurate.
From a market-centric point of view, the most accurate method
for determining the materiality of forward-looking statements is the
Contextual Standard of the Corporate Puffery Defense, which explic-
itly considers a forward-looking statement in light of all the
information available to the market. Prohibiting actionability for all
145. Courts usually recognize the fact that investors will "devalue the optimism of corpo-
rate executives, who have a stake in the future success of the [corporation]." Verifone, 784 F.
Supp. at 1481; Schaffer v. Timberland Co., 924 F. Supp. 1298, 1313 (D.N.H. 1996) (quoting the
same passage from Verifone); In re Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., 814 F. Supp. 850, 858 n.6 (N.D.
Cal. 1993) (same); see also Wielgos v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 892 F.2d 509, 515 (7th Cir.
1989) (noting that professional investors and analysts are capable of seeing through the
predictable optimism of corporate executives). But see Langevoort, supra note 10, at 494 n.79
(stating that although "sophisticated investors have some sense of when to doubt and when to
trust," they can be deceived when their trust is misplaced).
146. See supra note 141 (comparing the judicial notion of materiality with market reliance).
147. See Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1090-91 (1991). Forward-
looking statements referring to earnings are considered to be the most material of corporate
inside information because they have the ability to influence market prices. See Langevoort,
supra note 10, at 502 (stating that "[e]arnings forecasts are among the most material of corpo-
rate inside information precisely because they are able to influence market prices"); Gilson &
Kraakman, supra note 130, at 564 n.47 (explaining how investors discount the introduction of
new soft information by the reliability of the information).
148. See Basi et al., supra note 3, at 252 (concluding that "there is reasonable evidence that
company forecasts were better than analysts' forecasts").
149. But see Gross v. Summa Four, Inc., 93 F.3d 987, 995 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding that
"vague and loosely optimistic statements" are not materially misleading).
150. See supra note 145.
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vague statements does not address the infinite variations of corporate
statements. Consider a scenario where someone circulates
speculative negative rumors about a particular aspect of a
corporation's business, such as the viability of their new software. To
combat these rumors, the company could disclose an overly optimistic,
yet vague, statement dispelling these rumors. Investors may discount
the corporate optimism, but they will likely consider the optimism
when assessing the future earnings of the company. This
consideration reduces the importance investors place on negative
rumors and, therefore, increases the stock price. The duty of corpo-
rate officers to tell the truth to shareholders and the exclusive inside
information the officers possess justify such reliance.151 Thus,
statements that do not include fundamental data could nevertheless
impact the market's valuation of the stock. Deeming all facially
vague statements immaterial as a matter of law is over-inclusive. A
more narrow determination of whether a statement is so vague as to
be immaterial as a matter of law, taking into account the context in
which the statement was made, is necessary. The contextual
approach of the Corporate Puffery Defense offers precisely the type of
evaluation necessary to determine if the forward-looking statement
sufficiently induced market reliance in spite of its vague language or
failure to rise to the level of a guarantee.
D. Materiality Under the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995
Although the majority of securities fraud litigation applying
the Corporate Puffery Defense will rely on traditional 10b-5 analy-
sis,152 the proper application of the Corporate Puffery Defense must at
least be consistent with the most recent congressional amendment to
the securities laws, the Reform Act. The Reform Act provides a safe
harbor for certain types of forward-looking statements. 53 The first
prong'54  protects forward-looking statements that are either:
151. See supra text accompanying notes 92-95 (analyzing the reasonableness of investors
reliance on statements made by corporate officials).
152. See supra note 7 for the- traditional Rule 10b-5 analysis (listing requirements,
including materiality, necessary for plaintiff to allege a claim of securities fraud).
153. See supra note 1 (quoting the types of corporate statements considered to be "forward-
looking" by the Reform Act).
154. The Reform Act contains a two-pronged test. If a corporate statement does not fit
within the first prong, the second prong requires plaintiffs to prove that the speaker had actual
knowledge that the forward-looking statement was false and misleading. See 15 U.S.C.A.
§§ 77z-2(c)(1)(B)(I), 78u-5(c)(1)(B)(i) (West 1997). As more corporations use limiting cautionary
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(1) identified as forward-looking and accompanied by cautionary
statements detailing important factors that could cause actual results
to differ materially from those in the statement; 55 or (2) immaterial.156
Despite the fact that the Reform Act provides a statutory safe
harbor to protect statements that are immaterial, the Reform Act
does not define "immateriality. 157 In order to take advantage of the
immateriality provision in the Reform Act, defendants must look to
definitions of materiality previously developed in cases interpreting
Rule 10b-5.158
The rejection of securities fraud claims based on facially vague
forward-looking corporate statements meshes seamlessly with the
Reform Act's safe harbors. Once a court determines that a statement
statements in public documents filed with the SEC, fewer statements made in such disclosures
will be actionable under private securities fraud claims. Corporate officials are less likely,
however, to use cautionary statements in sound bites to the media or securities analysts. These
agents will increasingly rely upon the Corporate Puffery Defense, under the materiality provi-
sion of the first prong, to dismiss claims of securities fraud. This Note does not discuss the
ramifications of the heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure on private securities fraud class actions. For a more in-depth analysis of this topic,
see William S. Feinstein, Securities Fraud: Pleading Securities Fraud with
Particularity-Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) in the Rule 10b-5 Context: Kowal v. MCI
Communications Corporation, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 851 (1995); Olson et al., supra note 4, at
1115-17 (discussing the pleading requirement of scienter).
155. See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77z-2(c)(1)(A)(i), 78u-5(c)(1)(A)(i). When making oral corporate
statements to analysts or the press, the officers could meet the first prong of the safe harbor by
stating, for example:
I would like to make a number of forward-looking statements and to call your attention
to the fact that with respect to each one that the actual results could differ substantially
and materially from what we have projected. We have filed with the Securities
Exchange Commission as item 5 of Form 8-K [or in the case of the annual meeting these
statements appear in our annual report to shareholders] under date of - and you
can readily obtain additional information concerning important factors that could cause
the actual results to differ materially from what we have predicted. That having been
said, we expect _, -, and - to happen within the forthcoming year.
BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 178, at 887. Perhaps not surprisingly, CEOs are reluctant to protect
themselves with such verbiage in sound bites and conference calls.
156. See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77z-2(c)(1)(A)(ii), 78u-5(c)(1)(A)(ii). The legislative history of the
Reform Act indicates that the drafters of the Reform Act intended to encourage the continued
use of the Corporate Puffery Defense under the immateriality provision of the first prong.
Senator Domenici stated "[optimistic opinions] or puffing has no effect on a company's share
price and courts should continue to quickly dismiss cases based on these types of statements."
141 CONG. REC. S17970 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of Senator Domenici). Senator Hatch
agreed, stating that "[s]ome companies have faced damaging lawsuits merely on the basis of
vague but optimistic projections that the company would do well even though it was clear that
the prediction was speculative and future oriented. The safe harbor provision sensibly
addresses those problems." 141 CoNG. REC. S19054 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (statement of
Senator Hatch).
157. See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77z-2(i), 78u (not explicitly defining "materiality" for purposes of
the statute).
158. See Pitt et al., supra note 5, at 852; supra Part III.A (discussing cases interpreting
materiality in the context of 10b-5 actions).
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is immaterial, the statement falls within the immateriality provision
of the Reform Act's safe harbor, and the plaintiffs claims against the
corporation are not actionable.
Wholesale protection of forward-looking statements that fail to
rise to the level of a guarantee, however, would expand the
immateriality provision so as to render the other provisions of the safe
harbor meaningless. Congress enacted the Reform Act to protect only
certain forward-looking statements. 159 If only forward-looking state-
ments that constitute a guarantee were material, virtually all
forward-looking statements would be protected. No reason would
exist either to include meaningful cautionary language16 or to prove
the defendant's actual knowledge that the statement was false or
misleading. 161 As Congress could not have intended to afford protec-
tion for such a broad range of statements, courts should reject the
Guarantee Standard.
E. Materiality Policy Considerations
The proper application of the Corporate Puffery Defense
achieves two policy objectives: limiting investor strike suits and
encouraging corporate disclosure. In the face of a growing number of
securities fraud class action suits, 162 some courts recognized the
potential effect of the Corporate Puffery Defense would be to
eliminate a large number of frivolous strike suits at a preliminary
stage. 6 3 Courts that properly apply the Corporate Puffery Defense
effectively counter the abusive inefficiencies of these suits 64 by
159. The Reform Act protects forward-looking statements that are either accompanied by
adequate cautionary language or immaterial. See supra notes 1, 5, 155-56 and accompanying
text.
160. See supra note 155 and accompanying text (discussing the meaningful cautionary
language provision of the first prong of the Reform Act safe harbor).
161. See supra note 154 (discussing the second prong of the Reform Act safe harbor).
162. See Hillson Partners Ltd. Partnership v. Adage, Inc., 42 F.3d 204, 220 & n.14 (4th Cir.
1994) (noting that "the mere existence of an unresolved lawsuit has settlement value to the
plaintiff' in securities fraud cases).
163. See id. at 220 (quoting and applying Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S.
723, 742-43 (1975) (recognizing that the need to eliminate the settlement value of an unresolved
lawsuit and reduce the threat of extensive discovery and avoid disruption of normal business
practice justifies the elimination of claims at an early stage)); see also Lasker v. New York State
Elec. & Gas Corp., 85 F.3d 55, 59 (2d Cir. 1996) (dismissing Lasker's claims of securities fraud
on summary judgment).
164. See supra note 6 (discussing the abuses of private securities litigation). The expected
cost of a private securities fraud defense more often determines the settlement value than do
the merits of the claims. See S. REP. No. 104-98, at 9 (1995); Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the




finding claims based on questionable language worthy of dismissal as
a matter of law. However, judicious use of this methodology is
necessary to ensure the goals of securities disclosure are met and that
fraud is not perpetuated on the investing public.
Vague statements derive their uncertainty from the speaker.
When one opines that a corporation will have a good year, the listener
reasonably should believe such a statement lacks the certainty on
which to base an investment decision. 165 When uncertain forward-
looking statements contain specific data, however, the receiver of the
information introduces the uncertainty element when evaluating how
to rely on the statement.166 To the extent that these forward-looking
statements may reasonably influence an investor's valuation of the
stock, such statements do not deserve the same fact-blind blanket
protection contextually vague statements receive.
Judicial application of the Corporate Puffery Defense under a
contextual interpretation is a useful way to effectively, yet fairly,
screen investor strike suits. 167 Claims alleging market reliance on
contextually vague corporate statements likely are not worthy of the
expensive discovery process. 68 Dismissing these claims early in the
litigation process diminishes the damaging effect on the corporation
and the courts, effectively fulfilling the first policy objective of the
Corporate Puffery Defense.
The second policy objective the Corporate Puffery Defense
achieves is the protection of corporate speech. 169 An efficient market
economy must have efficient capital allocation through which
entrepreneurs can receive the needed capital for projects the market
165. The listener could interpret this statement in numerous ways. Listeners would likely
not be influenced when adjusting their valuation of the security because of the lack of funda-
mental information in the statement. See Stransky v. Cummins Engine Co., 51 F.3d 1329,
1334-35 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding that a press release's mention of "cost curves," without more,
was subject to multiple interpretations).
166. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 130, at 564 n.47 (explaining how investors dis-
count the introduction of new soft information by the reliability of the information).
167. See Steven B. Rosenfeld, "Immateriality as a Matter of Law". An Effective Curb on
Securities Fraud Litigation, 28 STANDARD & POOR'S REV. SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 169, 169
(Oct. 11, 1995) (discussing the judicial and corporate efficiency of dismissing investor strike
suits by finding immateriality as a matter of law).
168. See supra note 6 (discussing the lack of merit in many private securities class actions).
169. As Senator Bennett noted in the debate overriding the President's veto of the Reform
Act:
In the name of protecting the investor, we are depriving the investor of the very best
guesses so labeled, estimates so labeled, conjectures so labeled, of the people who know
the most about the company. We are asking the investor to fly even more blind than
they would be if they had those guesses.
141 CONG. REC. S19049 (daily ed. Dec. 21 1995).
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determines sufficiently promising. 170 The Corporate Puffery Defense
permits entrepreneurs to discuss their opinions openly with the
possessors of capital. The drafters of the Reform Act specifically
designed the safe harbor to encourage corporate officers to provide the
market with forward-looking information. 1' 1 Excessive liability for
forward-looking information deters entrepreneurs from discussing
their prospects,17 2 which denies profitable ventures to the market and
withholds useful goods and services from the public. 7 3
At some point, however, forward-looking statements contain
language so specific they induce a revaluation of the corporation's
stock price. Although courts should not hold corporations liable every
time predictions fail to materialize, 1' 4 they should impose liability
when the forward-looking statements affect the market and the
corporation acted without reasonable basis or good faith when
releasing the statements.17 5 For example, a court should not shield
from liability a corporation that inflates the market price by publicly
predicting specific revenue growth if the speaker knew such
performance would be difficult to achieve. When corporations release
statements that have the ability to influence the market price of their
stock, a jury should resolve the truthfulness of the statements.
Should such information be fraudulent, protecting the statements
would no longer serve the public interest.'7 6
170. See Grace Pownall et al., The Stock Price Effects of Alternative Types of Management
Earnings Forecasts, 68 ACCT. REV. 896 (1993) (examining the stock price effects of alternative
types of management earnings forecasts).
171. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 43 (1995) (discussing the purpose of the safe
harbor provision).
172. See Raab v. General Physics Corp., 4 F.3d 286, 290 (4th Cir. 1993) (noting that exces-
sive liability "would put companies in a whipsaw"); Ayers, supra note 132, at 954 (describing the
problem of inefficient silencing when corporations refuse to speak to the public to avoid ineffi-
cient lawsuits). This silencing deprives the markets of useful information. See id.
Theoretically, markets should be unaffected by the absence of vague puffing statements.
173. The Supreme Court discussed the dangers of setting the materiality threshold too low
and subjecting corporations to liability for insignificant statements in TSC Industries, Inc. v.
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 448-49 (1976).
174. See Serabian v. Amoskeag Bank Shares, Inc., 24 F.3d 357, 361 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding
that "optimistic predictions about the future that prove to be off the mark" were not actionable);
Pommer v. Medtest Corp., 961 F.2d 620, 623 (7th Cir. 1992) ("The securities laws approach
matters from an ex ante perspective: just as a statement true when made does not become
fraudulent because things unexpectedly go wrong, so a statement materially false when made
does not become acceptable because it happens to come true.").
175. That is, courts should hold forward-looking statements to the appropriate standards of
Rule 175, Rule 3b-6, and the standards for private litigation set forth in the Reform Act. See
supra Part III.D (describing the standards of private securities fraud litigation).
176. However, "[tihe securities laws were not enacted to protect sophisticated businessmen
from their own errors ofjudgment." Hirsch v. du Pont, 553 F.2d 750, 763 (2d Cir. 1977); see also
IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1011 (2d Cir. 1975) (stressing that a memorandum discuss-
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The fundamental purpose of the securities laws and their sys-
tem of mandatory disclosure is to protect investors by eliminating
fraud in the purchase and sale of securities. 177 The Reform Act,
however, shifts away from this fundamental purpose, adding a caveat
emptor element to securities regulation by providing a statutory safe
harbor for forward-looking statements to balance the protections the
securities laws otherwise give investors. 178 To create the proper
balance, courts must walk a fine line and consider the context in
which these statements were made before determining materiality.
Courts should keep these policy objectives in mind when contextually
evaluating the distinction between actionable fraudulent statements
and mere puffery:
IV. SYNOPSIS
Crystal balls cannot foretell the future of the corporate world.
Similarly, no one can guarantee the future performance of a corpora-
tion. As a result, a standard requiring forward-looking corporate
statements to rise to the level of a guarantee 179 to be actionable implic-
itly prevents securities fraud claims on almost any forward-looking
statement.180 Dismissing all securities fraud claims failing to measure
up to this elusive standard, as the Fourth Circuit does, is inconsistent
ing potential returns on a capital investment was not likely to mislead a sophisticated investor).
While business leaders might mistakenly divulge an overly specific projection without the
necessary cautionary statements required to obtain statutory protection, such instances are
rare. Most specific projections are intentional and can be eliminated only by an absolute ban on
all communication except properly disclosed financial projections. See, e.g., Vengeance or
Growth?, WALL ST. J., Nov. 26, 1991, at A14 (describing how Oracle Systems Corp. refused to
discuss forward-looking information with analysts after being sued for securities fraud 19 times
in 1990).
177. See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124 (1953) (finding that Congress cre-
ated the Securities Act to protect investors by encouraging corporations to disclose information
"necessary to [make] informed investment decisions"); H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 3-4 (1933)
(stating that Congress intended the Securities Act to provide investors with facts essential to
estimate the value of securities).
178. See BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 13, at 848.
179. Although some circuits have adopted the Guarantee Standard, few courts have at-
tempted to define "guarantee." See supra notes 49, 53 for a discussion of cases employing the
guarantee standard.
180. Although the Guarantee Standard does not place all forward-looking statements
beyond the reach of the securities laws, see supra text accompanying note 49 (discussing cases
that imply that only statements not rising to the level of a guarantee are immaterial and there-
fore cannot serve as the basis of a claim of securities fraud), realistically, virtually no forward-
looking statements would rise to the level of a guarantee.
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with: (1) prior decisions evaluating materiality under Rule 10b-5;'81
(2) modern financial theory;182 (3) the commercial common law;183
(4) the Reform Act;'8 and (5) the policy rationales underlying the
Corporate Puffery Defense.18 5 Despite the obvious efficiencies gained
by dismissing claims based on forward-looking statements,18 6 adopting
a per se rule permits corporations to affect the market price of their
stock with forward-looking statements regardless of their veracity,
good faith, or reasonable basis. Such wholesale protection of
fraudulent corporate statements is inconsistent with the goals of the
securities laws, the Corporate Puffery Defense, or public policy. Thus,
courts should overrule and reject the line of cases supporting the
Guarantee Standard. s8
At some point, forward-looking corporate statements are so
facially vague and uninformative that a reasonable investor would
never rely on the information to make an investment decision. Like a
falling tree that no one hears, facially vague statements in sophisti-
cated markets have no effect on stock price because no one would
reasonably rely on them. Such statements are so vague and indefinite
that they cannot support an action for securities fraud. The dismissal
of such securities fraud claims based on facially vague statements is
justified by the following considerations: (1) consistency with the
commercial common law doctrine of puffery; (2) consistency with
181. This Contextual Standard is consistent with Basic in that it evaluates whether the
corporate statements have altered the total mix of information made available.
182. This Contextual Standard still permits a fact finder to evaluate the good faith and
reasonable basis of corporate disclosures once the plaintiff proves that the statements were
material enough to affect the reasonable investor's investment decision. See supra note 154
(describing the second prong of the Reform Act's Safe Harbor).
183. This contextual definition mirrors the common law doctrine of puffery by effectively
permitting the speaker to lie so long as nothing specific is said. See supra Part III.B.
184. Compared to the Vagueness Standard and the Guarantee Standard, the Contextual
Standard provides a more holistic inquiry into which statements should be judicially determined
to be "immaterial" according to the Reform Act. See supra note 154 (describing the
"immateriality prong" of the Reform Act).
185. This Contextual Standard permits courts and corporations to dismiss private securi-
ties fraud strike suits at an early stage before an expensive and time-consuming discovery
occurs. It also protects the corporation's ability to release information to the public by recogniz-
ing its ability to state opinions as to future events without incurring liability if the prediction
fails to materialize. See supra Part III.E.
186. Such inefficiencies include the aggregate effect on the economy from the defendant-
corporation's high costs of discovery and litigation of a securities fraud class action, which are
detailed supra note 6.
187. See, e.g., Herman v. Legent Corp., No. 94-1445, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 5568, at *14
(4th Cir. Mar. 20, 1995) (holding that forward-looking statements that do not constitute a
guarantee are immaterial as a matter of law); Hillson Partners Ltd. Partnership v. Adage, Inc.,
42 F.3d 204, 211-12 (4th Cir. 1994) (same); Malone v. Microdyne Corp., 26 F.3d 471, 479 (4th
Cir. 1994) (same); Raab v. General Physics Corp., 4 F.3d 286, 289-90 (4th Cir. 1993) (same).
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modern financial theory and the fraud-on-the-market theory; (3)
consistency with the safe harbor provisions of the Reform Act; and (4)
effectiveness in screening securities fraud strike suits. These
justifications provide a compelling rationale for the continued use of
the Corporate Puffery Defense to dismiss securities fraud claims
when they are based on vague forward-looking statements.
Establishing that courts should apply the Corporate Puffery
Defense in certain circumstances is only half the battle, however.
Establishing how courts should determine when forward-looking
corporate statements are sufficiently vague and immaterial to
warrant dismissal as a matter of law under the Corporate Puffery
Defense is substantially more difficult. Providing a practical
methodology to govern the application of the defense is essential to
the efficacious application of the Corporate Puffery Defense. A
contextual application of the Corporate Puffery Defense achieves the
desirable results of protecting corporate statements that are so vague,
they have no market impact. The contextual application of the
Corporate Puffery Defense provides a more accurate method of
determining which statements are sufficiently immaterial, and thus is
logically consistent with the traditional notions of materiality
previously articulated by the Supreme Court, and mirrors the
contextual method used by commercial common law to find
statements immaterial as a matter of law. These benefits should
deter courts from overprotecting both forward-looking statements
that fail to rise to the level of a guarantee and facially vague
statements by adopting per se immateriality as a matter of law.188 In
the absence of a foolproof method to determine materiality of forward-
looking statements,'189 courts should consider the context in which the
statements were made. Despite the potential judicial difficulties in
applying such a test, 90 a contextual evaluation may be the only
188. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (citing Raab, Searls, San Leandro, and
Lasker as cases utilizing both the Vagueness Standard and the Guarantee Standard of the
Corporate Puffery Defense).
189. See supra note 141 and accompanying text (describing the difficulties of judicial
application of the event-study methodology to determine the materiality of forward-looking
statements on summary judgment).
190. Contextual application of the Corporate Puffery Defense by the judiciary will place
greater burdens on the plaintiffs, who will have to plead that the statements were material in
the context of the total mix of information available to the market in their well-pleaded com-
plaint. See FED. R. CIv. P. 9(b) (requiring plaintiffs to plead with particularity in fraud cases);
see, e.g., Gilford Partners, L.P. v. Sensormatic Elec. Corp., No. 96 C 4072, 1997 WL 757495, at
*15 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 24, 1997) (requiring plaintiff to plead with particularity claims that
defendant's forward-looking statements were materially misleading in light of the information
available to the market regarding Sensormatics performance). This type of contextual approach
may also require more evaluation by courts, as they will have to weigh the impact of the
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effective method of analyzing whether vague forward-looking
corporate statements influence the market.
V. CONTEXTUAL METHODOLOGY OF THE CORPORATE
PUFFERY DEFENSE
This Note proposes that the proper application of the
Corporate Puffery Defense requires a two step process: (1) evaluating
the forward-looking statement in the abstract to identify the state-
ment as puffery, and (2) considering the context in which the state-
ment was made.191
First, as a threshold issue, a court should analyze the forward-
looking statement independent of the context in which the company
made the statement to determine whether it was so vague and inde-
terminate that no reasonable investor would rely on it when valuing
the price of a security. Sufficiently vague statements would create a
rebuttable presumption that the forward-looking statements are
immaterial as a matter of law.192 When deciding whether a forward-
looking statement meets this test, the absence of fundamental
forward-looking statements in light of the total mix of information available to the market,
rather than merely deciding that the language used by the corporation looks vague. Although
such analysis requires more judicial fact-finding to determine the context in which the corporate
statement was made, the high possibility that some vague forward-looking statements may
influence a security's market price warrants such judicial inquiry on motion to dismiss or on
summary judgment.
If, however, the Shaw and Simon cases in the First Circuit using the contextual method,
and the cases that consider the Bespeaks Caution Doctrine evidence the judicial feasibility of a
contextual approach, the author remains confident that all parties could handle the task. In
any event, such a determination on summary judgment is certainly more efficient than a full
jury trial on all five elements of securities fraud. See supra note 7 (setting forth the required
elements of establishing securities fraud under Rule 10b-5).
191. Before considering the Corporate Puffery Defense, a court will determine whether the
statement contains adequate cautionary language to satisfy either the first prong of the Reform
Act safe harbor or the judicially crafted Bespeaks Caution Doctrine. See supra note 155 and
accompanying text (describing the bounds of the first provision of the first prong of the Reform
Act safe harbor). If the forward-looking statement is found immaterial under either route, the
judicial inquiry ends and the securities fraud claims are dismissed either on motion to dismiss
or on summary judgment. If the corporate statement fails to contain adequate cautionary
language, the court should then use the contextual application of the Corporate Puffery
Defense.
Although the Corporate Puffery Defense is theoretically sound when applied to either a
motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment, the defendant should use the defense on a
motion to dismiss to maximize the efficiency of avoiding a costly discovery process. Otherwise,
the plaintiff has the opportunity to make a motion pursuant to F.R.C.P. 5b(f) to seek discovery
on the issues addressed in the motion.
192. Plaintiffs could overcome this presumption by showing facts related to the information
available to the market as contained in plaintiffs well-pleaded complaint.
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information provides evidence that the statement does not affect the
future income streams and, therefore, provides a presumption of
immateriality. 193 Corporate statements are relevant to the extent that
they provide some information about the corporation's future income
stream.194 Any statement that includes such information is important
to the market in setting a security's value.' 95 Unlike the Guarantee
Standard,98 this method would find some forward-looking statements
to contain adequately specific predictions that could justifiably serve
as the basis of a securities fraud claim.' 97  If the forward-looking
statement is specific enough to be material, the puffing inquiry ends.
Thus, the first step of the proper application of the Corporate Puffery
Defense mirrors the approach by Raab and its progeny. 198 A court
should not end its inquiry with the Vagueness Standard found in the
Raab analysis, 99 however, as this could include otherwise vague
statements that do influence the market price of a security. The first
step in the contextual application of the Corporate Puffery Defense
will merely identify puffing statements. If the forward-looking state-
ment meets the vagueness threshold, the court will move to the sec-
ond step of the puffing analysis.
A court's second step should analyze the forward-looking state-
ment in the context of the total mix of information available to the
market. Such an analysis mirrors the approach used by the courts in
Shaw and Simon.200 This contextual analysis requires a consideration
193. See Langevoort, supra note 10, at 502 (stating that earnings estimates are some of the
most material statements made by a corporation); supra text accompanying notes 129-33
(discussing the market's reliance on fundamental information). Statements can contain infor-
mation that would affect a specific risk without including financial projections. In this respect,
the exclusion of fundamental information must be weighed accordingly.
194. See Barondes, supra note 10, at 276.
195. See id.
196. See supra Part II.B.
197. See, e.g., Gilford Partners, L.P. v. Sensormatic Elec. Corp., No. 96 C 4072, 1997 WL
757495, at *14 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 24, 1997) (finding that defendant's statements were made with
sufficient specificity to escape puffery classification and warrant procession of plaintiffs claims
to trial); Simon v. American Power Conversion Corp., 945 F. Supp. 416, 428-29 (D.R.I. 1996)
(same).
198. See supra Part II.A.
199. Under the Corporate Puffery Defense methodology advocated by this Note, finding
vagueness under the Raab approach merely creates a presumption, rebuttable by the plaintiff,
that the forward-looking corporate statement is immaterial as a matter of law, rather than
allowing the courts to determine prematurely the per se immateriality of such vague language
as advocated by the Vagueness Standard.
200. See supra Part II.C. The Contextual Standard recommended here differs from the
Contextual Standard the court applied in Schaffer, where the court analyzed the Corporate
Puffery Defense based upon the information available to defendants, a subjective test, rather
than upon the information available to the markets, an objective test.
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of the forward-looking statement's impact on the total mix of
information available to the market.20 1
Additional information available to the market may impact the
corporate statement's materiality. A corporation's forward-looking
statement is likely to affect a security's market price when corporate
estimates coincide with the third-party information available to the
market. Conversely, when corporate estimates are inconsistent with
projections available elsewhere, truth on the market exists, and the
conflicting information discounts the excessively optimistic
statements of the corporation, lessening the impact on market price. 202
Courts should also consider the source of the information to be
another important element in the determination of materiality, al-
though most private securities fraud claims are based on official cor-
porate sources such as officers, directors, internal public relations
departments, outside public relations firms, or other such designated
representatives .203
The vagueness of the language has an impact on the
materiality of the statement to the extent that the statement does not
affect an investor's risk assessment or estimations of the corporation's
future financial performance. 204  Where the statement adds
information not otherwise available to the market and would influ-
ence the market price of a security, the court will find the statement
material and permit the securities fraud claim to proceed to trial.
201. See supra note 83 and accompanying text (describing the Supreme Court's Basic
holding that materiality should be determined in light of the total mix of information available
to the market).
202. See In re Apple Computer Sec. Litig., 886 F.2d 1109, 1116 (9th Cir. 1989) (failing to
hold Apple Computer liable for optimistic statements when the market had sufficient informa-
tion from press sources to undermine any positive effect the corporate statements may have
had). Strict construction of this factor may result in bias against companies agreeing with
analysts and the press; however, the bias may be justified, as investors do consider information
coinciding with market estimates more reliable than statements to the contrary.
203. See, e.g., Grossman v. Novell, Inc., 120 F.3d 1112, 1121 (10th Cir. 1997) (considering
the context in which allegedly misleading statements were made); supra note 31 (listing cases
that focus on the vague language of corporate representatives).
204. See, e.g., Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1218-19 (1st Cir. 1996) (finding
that the statements would not have affected a reasonable investor's investment decision and,
thus, were not actionable); In re Royal Appliance Sec. Litig., No. 94-3284, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS
24626, at *7 (6th Cir. Aug. 15, 1995) (same); Searls v. Glasser, 64 F.3d 1061, 1066 (7th Cir.
1995) (same); Raab v. General Physics Corp., 4 F.3d 286, 289-90 (4th Cir. 1993) (same); Simon
v. American Power Conversion Corp., 945 F. Supp. 416, 428-29 (D.R.I. 1996) (same); Schaffer v.





Contemporary financial markets compel corporations to make
forward-looking statements predicting future performance.
Unfortunately, so long as uncertainty remains a fixture in the corpo-
rate landscape, some of these forward-looking statements will inevi-
tably fail to materialize. When the discrepancies between these
statements and the corporation's actual performance induce signifi-
cant reductions in the market's valuation of the company's stock,
shareholders likely will file a private securities litigation class action
suit. To prove such a claim, the shareholders must show that these
forward-looking statements were material, otherwise their claims will
be dismissed on motion to dismiss or on summary judgment.
After analyzing the methods employed by different courts to
determine the immateriality of forward-looking statements on sum-
mary judgment, this Note concludes that some forward-looking state-
ments will be so vague that the market will not rely on them.
Whether these forward-looking statements rise to the level of a
guarantee is irrelevant to this determination of immateriality as a
matter of law. Furthermore, not all vague statements are per se
immaterial as a matter of law; thus, courts should also consider such
vague statements in the context of the information available to the
markets. Courts should dismiss securities fraud claims based on such
contextually immaterial puffing statements to save all parties from
enduring the lengthy and expensive litigation process.
R. Gregory Roussel*
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